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Mexxx
Starting Member
USA
56 Posts |
 Posted - Feb 21 2003 : 2:25:02 PM
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Overall Analysis
The Fine Line
At the top level of football, in an era when teams are often evenly matched, the fine line between winning and losing can be the result of any of the following:
• a decision by a coach, e.g. Senol Gunes, the Turkish coach, made a pivotal decision when he replaced his captain, Hakan Sukur, with Ilhan Mansiz, after 67 minutes, against Senegal – Mansiz proved to be the matchwinner with his Golden Goal strike;
• an individual action, e.g. Ronaldo’s solo effort against Turkey in the semi-final (players who can make and take chances without assistance are vital in the modern game);
• a counter-attack, e.g. Senegal’s winner in the opening game against France;
• a set piece, e.g. Batistuta’s winning header from a back-post corner against Nigeria;
• a mistake, e.g. miskick by Turkish goalkeeper Rustu that led to Brazil’s match-winning penalty in Ulsan. For the national coach, the importance of these elements is considerable.
Counter-Attack
Approximately 20% of the goals scored from open play in Korea/Japan 2002 came as the result of a counter-attack. In addition, it must not be forgotten that many set pieces, which resulted in goals, were gained following a counter. Some teams operated a counter-attacking
policy – a style of play based on defending deeply and breaking forward when the opportunity presents itself. Others, and this includes most of the more successful teams, played a balanced game, but used counterattacking moves as part of their repertoire. For
many teams, such as England and Germany, the ‘traditional’ counter-attack (where the ball is played long to one or two attackers, in a big space, and against a few defenders) was used effectively. There were also excellent examples of ‘collective counters’ (where a
group of players break, and combine to form a wave of attack, before the opponent can fully regroup), and this was particularly well illustrated by a number of teams, including Brazil and Senegal. In today’s sophisticated game, nobody gives space for free, and
therefore counter-attacking ability is vital to exploit the fleeting moments when an opponent is disorganised and has allowed space to appear between and behind their midfield and defensive players.
Solo Play
Approximately one-fifth of the 161 goals scored during the competition were the product of individual actions (i.e. long-range shots, direct free kicks, individual dribbling and shooting). Good examples of this key element in top-level football included Robert
Carlos’ ‘ballistic’ free kick against China, Dario Rodriguez’s long-range volley for Uruguay versus Denmark, and Henrik Larsson’s evasive run and calm finish for Sweden in the match with Nigeria. The importance of the soloist has increased as efficiency in defending
has improved – sometimes the only way to beat the defensive block is through powerful, long-range shooting or individual wizardry.
Set Piece Play
Set pieces accounted for around 30% of all the goals scored in the championship, with the biggest return coming from corners. There was an extensive variety of corner kicks on show (corners played short, to the front or back post, or even outside of the box) and the
delivery of both inswingers and outswinger was particularly impressive. Free kicks from wide positions were also noteworthy, with the ball being curled both towards and away from the goal with pace and head-high precision. Surprising moves on free kicks from the
edge of the box, à la Argentina versus England in 1998, were non-existent. A lack of privacy and obsessive spying has inhibited today’s coaches, and consequently there is a reluctance
to spend time on ‘clever’ free kicks that might only be used on one occasion.
Pressing
The pressing game, particularly in midfield, was employed by many teams despite the strength-sapping weather. Many pressed the ball and doubled up on the ball carrier, some were efficient at collective pressing (i.e. coordinated group pressure), and a number of
sides were also able to condense the space by playing as a compact, mobile team unit – Ireland, Sweden, USA, Denmark, Turkey, England, Japan and Korea were outstanding at applying this tactic. The stamina and speed endurance required to enforce a high-intensity
pressing game was particularly impressive in the case of Ireland, the USA and Korea, to name but three. In the case of Korea, their capacity to take the initiative (i.e. attacking
with and without the ball), to operate their ‘Dutch’ 3-4-3 system, and to dominate for the bulk of each match, was astonishing. Four months of full-time training certainly paid dividends for the Koreans.
Combination Play
Combination play (i.e. two, three or four players exchanging short, quick passes, usually in the central attacking area of the field) was highly developed and demonstrated to great effect by many teams, including Spain, Denmark, Argentina, Mexico and Turkey.
When analysing combination play, two types must be considered: the predictable and the unpredictable. In the former category, which is based on well-developed training methods, the Germans, Italians, and Americans were fine exponents. In contrast, the Brazilians,
Costa Ricans, Senegalese, and other ‘flamboyant’ types, those with a flair for inventiveness and unconventional technique, often put together combinations that mesmerised and surprised the defending team.
Tactical Flexibility
The ability to change structure, and sometimes style, during a match, or from match to match is an important component in a team’s armoury. When Korea were losing to Italy, Guus Hiddink changed his approach and went from his adventurous 3-4-3 to an ultra-risk-taking 3-2-5 – it worked, because he saved the game, and then saw Ahn Jung-Hwan
score the Golden Goal to win him and Korea the match. Brazil outclassed Costa Rica, but their organisation lacked balance, and Scolari introduced a two-man midfield screen in front
of the back three for the quarter-final against England. Examples of tactical flexibility were plentiful.
Technical Quality
In the 2002 FIFA World Cup™, teamwork, emphasising compactness in defence and attack and involving a minimum of 7 or 8 players, often overshadowed the individual. However, the technical ability of most players, including many defenders, was of a high standard. It has become a necessity for players to break from the back, to ‘give and go’, and thus increase the numbers in the attacking area. Brazil’s back three were all capable of springing from their defensive positions and joining in the creative build-up. The
same applied to players from Senegal, Spain, Turkey, Argentina, Costa Rica and a number of others. Team-oriented skills were the norm, with functionality, accuracy, and speed the priorities. Some, however, transcended the conventional, and this was particularly true
of many players playing in the hole between attack and midfield (i.e. second strikers), such as Rivaldo, Ronaldinho, Sas, Raúl, Totti,
Playing systems
Photos: Carlos Alberto Parreira
Playing systems – flexible frameworks
During Korea/Japan 2002, some teams used their team organisation to emphasise a positive philosophy, while others concentrated on the collective compactness of the team unit, in order to deny the opposition time and space,thus minimising their attacking options. Of
the 32 participating teams, the vast majority took the former view, and this was one reason why most matches in the competition were free-flowing, attractive encounters.
Approximately a dozen different playing systems were used during the 2002 FIFA World Cup™, but all of them could be grouped into two general categories: those based on the conventional 4-4-2 formation, and those with their roots in the traditional 3-5-2.
Twenty-four teams (75%) chose the first approach, and eight of them operated with two lines of four, plus two strikers. It must be emphasised at this point that many teams changed their set-up during certain matches for tactical reasons, while others altered their formation from game to game, often because of necessity. Some using 4-4-2 defended with 5-4-1, or changed to that arrangement when the game demanded a less adventurous approach (e.g. England in the second half against Argentina when they fought to maintain their onegoal
advantage). Other formations employed were variations on the basic 4-4-2 theme including 4-4-1-1 as operated by Spain, Italy and the USA, 4-3-1-2 (e.g. Uruguay), 4-5-1 (e.g.Russia), 4-3-2-1 (e.g. Senegal), and also the formation that evolved at EURO 2000 and continues
to increase in popularity, consisting of a four-man back line, two central midfielders (the defensive screen), and an backing “diamond”(one striker, two wide attackers, and a creative
orchestrator between midfield and attack, à la Zidane or Wilmots).
Argentina also favoured the attacking diamond, but coach Marcelo Bielsa elected to play with three-man defensive and midfield units, thus producing a formation that could be interpreted as 3-3-3-1. Including Argentina, 40% of the teams used three central defenders, with most trying to hold a flat line – the days of the detached libero seem to be numbered. While Germany, Costa Rica and Cameroon based their organisation on the “tried and tested” 3-
5-2 system, another eight teams devised variations on this basic theme. Brazil, for example, employed an attack-orientated formation of 3-4-2-1, in which only four players could be classed as defence-minded (i.e. the back three and Silva, the anchorman in midfield). Ronaldo led the attack, and was ably supported from the second line by Rivaldo and Ronaldinho, and from the middle and wide positions by Juninho, Cafu and Roberto Carlos. The coaches of Korea,
Slovenia and Turkey opted for a similar pattern to the Brazilians, while the Japanese and Mexicans modified their approach to create a 3-4-1-2 configuration, with traditional twin strikers.
A number of trends, relating to team organisation, were observed during the 32-team final tournament in Korea and Japan. Although a slight majority of teams selected two strikers, the use of one target player, or pivot of the attack, was also common (e.g.Hakan Sukur, Morientes, Batistuta, Hwang). Those teams with a clearly defined lone
striker exploited the attacking space with midfield runners, using lightning-fast counters or quick combinations; while those with a striking partnership often had one speedy, mobile front player feeding off a powerful partner – cross-over runs and back-to-front movement were common in such arrangements. With many teams employing powerful central midfield players as a defensive wall, the creative schemer, once the dominating force in the middle of the field, was seen mainly in wide positions (e.g. Beckham,Okocha, Ortega, Schneider and Fadiga) or between the middle and front lines (e.g.
Zidane, Veron, Recoba, Wilmots, Nakata and Olembe). Irrespective of their starting position,these midfield playmakers dictate the pace and the flow of the game, and during the World Cup such players had a major influence on the fortunes of their respective teams.
In Korea/Japan 2002, some teams were loyal to their well-established system of play (e.g. Germany, Ireland and South Africa); some adhered to the pattern dictated and designed by the coach (e.g. Korea, Argentina and Senegal); some built their teams around
key players (e.g. France, Brazil and Japan); and some adapted, depending on the tactical situation (e.g. Croatia from game to game, or England within a particular match). On the evidence
of the 2002 FIFA World Cup™, the eternal question for coaches – should the players fit the system of should the system suit the players? – remains open for debate.
Confederations’ Analysis
CONCACAF
The CONCACAF representatives, Costa Rica, Mexico and USA, were surprisingly impressive,not just in terms of their results, but also their performances. The teams have made enormous progress. There are many reasons for this development – improved training and
competition, the creation of strong domestic leagues, improved youth coaching systems, more international matches – to name but a few. Many players now also play for top clubs in Europe and South America. The Americans played with a lot of selfconfidence and used a number of formations. They were also powerful, full of energy and good on the counter-attack. However, they were unfortunate to lose to Germany in the quarter-finals, missing a golden opportunity to reach the semi-finals. The new young generation,with players such as Donovan, Beasley and McBride, has breathed new life into the American team, and they can now look forward to the future with confidence.
Mexico employed a tactical formation that was tailored to the team’s abilities, a decision that bore fruit as it led to victories over fancied Italy and Croatia in the group stages. However, despite dominating neighbours USA in their round of 16 duel, they could not take advantage of their many chances and ultimately paid the price. Costa Rica only just failed to qualify for the round of 16, Turkey’s better goal difference taking them through at the Costa Ricans’
expense, who would live to regret missing the many chances carved out against eventual world champions Brazil. The team played attractive football and was athletic and well organised. The three teams were fine representatives for the CONCACAF confederation
and it will be interesting to follow their future progress.
The Final
Final – Class Counts
Brazil, the most successful nation in international football, won their fifth FIFA World Cup™ title by beating Germany 2-0 in Yokohama. The charismatic Ronaldo was the scoring hero with both goals, but in this, the 17th FIFA final, the Brazilians, as a team, gave substance to the theory that technical ability and attacking flair normally make the difference. If the Brazilians had the three Rs (Ronaldo, Rivaldo and Ronaldinho), then the Germanshad three aces of their own: team spirit, aerial power and Oliver Kahn. It was German
spirit that set the tone for the final, as Rudi Völler’s men surprised everyone by taking the initiative. Operating a 3-4-1-2 system with Bernd Schneider in the floating role behind the strikers, the Germans squeezed the space between their back and middle lines, and pushed up in order to keep their team unit as compact as possible. However, this was not just a pressing game by the Germans, there was quality in their passing, and they constructed
the play at pace on the wet surface. In fact, the Europeans actually dominated possession during the first half (56%), and Schneider and Oliver Neuville caught the eye with some lively, skilful attacking play. During the opening 45 minutes, Brazil were often pinned back, yet they still produced the best chances of the half: Ronaldinho,
an artist who smiles at his work, twice put Ronaldo in the clear with incisive through passes, but the Brazilian number 9 failed to hit the target with his first effort, and was denied by Kahn on the second opportunity. Kleberson then took matters into his own hands, but his
long-range shot cannoned off the crossbar. The half ended with no goals, but with Brazil beginning to look menacing. One minute into the second period and Germany could have, should have, taken the lead: from a Neuville corner on the left, Jeremies had a free header from close range, but the Bayern Munich man’s effort was well
blocked by Edmilson. Two minutes later, Neuville had the 69,000 crowd gasping as he forced a magnificent one-handed save from the Brazilian keeper, following a 25-metre free kick – the ball crashed off the post and sped away to safety. The rain poured down and the
slippery ball was passed with greater ease, as space began to open up. Brazil’s Kleberson, contrary to popular belief, is a free-spirited attacking midfield player, and he, in harmony with ‘wing wizards’ Cafu and Roberto Carlos, began to offer greater support to the irresistible Rs in the Brazilian front line. With 23 minutes left to play, Ronaldo lost the ball, won it back from Dietmar Hamann, slipped it to Rivaldo, and sprinted towards
goal in anticipation of a rebound. Rivaldo’s long-range shot inexplicably ricocheted off Oliver Kahn’s chest, and there was the exuberant Ronaldo to power the ball into the net. It was the beginning of the end. Twelve minutes after the first goal, Brazil scored again: Kleberson broke down the right-hand side, and played a firm, angled pass in the direction of Rivaldo and Ronaldo. The former’s awareness of the speed on the ball and the match situation
encouraged him to let it run through his legs to his waiting team-mate – Ronaldo took the pace off the ball and then guided it into the bottom corner of the net. Between the goals, Rudi Völler had introduced Oliver Bierhoff and Gerald Asamoah to the fray, but neither could reverse the inevitable, as a sea of yellow poured over the white German wall. Ronaldo left the stage to tumultuous applause, and for the final few minutes, his replacement, Denilson, gave an exhibition of trickery, as the Brazilians produced
counters galore. Referee Pierluigi Collina, a master craftsman
in his own right, blew for full-time, and Luiz Felipe Scolari allowed his tough image to evaporate as he hugged his victorious team of talents. Rudi Völler, unfolded his arms, and offered them in consolation to his crestfallen, battle-weary players. In the final analysis, Brazil had the firepower, the technical ability, and the flair which made the difference.
Interview: Luiz Felipe Scolari
Interview with Luiz Felipe Scolari,coach of Brazil’s World Champions
What actually changed in this squad that had left Brazil to much scepticism from the fans and returned as world champions? What criteria did you use to unite the team that represented Brazil in the World Cup?
Scolari:
People did not realise that it was my duty to decide who would be in the World Cup after the qualifiers and the various friendlies we had played. The European teams did not allow me to have all of the players I wanted. Nobody really believed that those players
from domestic clubs who had played in friendlies a few months before the World Cup would actually be selected for the final squad. Most people thought that the players in Brazil
had virtually no chance of making it to the World Cup. But I knew something important:
in Brazil there are great players whom I use in two ways. First of all, I give them the chance
and let them dream that they too can feature in the World Cup squad. Secondly, I knew that
if the footballers playing in Brazil had a good record, this would motivate those in Europe
to work even harder to be selected for our squad. It was a way of motivating the players
in Europe to be chosen for the final selection. This was the way I managed to raise everyone’s
morale. Those in Brazil had to demonstrate their potential to find a place in the
final group. And those in Europe had to play at full strength and not rest on their laurels
simply because they are stars. The message was clear: for me, it is not enough to enjoy star
status, regardless of whether you play for Real or Milan or Manchester United. If someone is
not playing well or the way I like it, there are other players in Brazil ready to take his place. I
believe that this motivation worked well.
When you agreed to become Brazil’ national coach you were the object of great envy from the fans. But as a club coach without
experience of national teams how did you adapt and how did you become “Felipão Brazil”?
Scolari:
Well, first of all, I decided that “Felipão Brazil” would not be very different from Felipão
of the former clubs. If people wanted me in the squad it is because I had worked well with
clubs before that. I was successful at the clubsby following my convictions so I felt obliged to
follow the same road. I thought that because I had applied working methods combined with
my tactics and my personality in the clubs, I did not need to change but, rather, I had to
make sure I did nothing differently from what had helped me win two Copas Libertadores,
various Brazilian league championship titles and other awards. I had to be consistent and
keep up my method of working because it was the public, the fans who cried out for me to
be appointed. I remember after one game in the qualifying round that we struggled to get
through I was alone in the dressing-room for a while and I thought: not only will I not
change my habits but, on the contrary, I’ll try to transform the Brazilian squad into a great
club! I’ll work with the squad as if it were a club. And what we discovered at the end of
the World Cup was just that. It didn’t seem like a chosen group of players who never get
together but, on the contrary, they were all happy and united as if they had been sportsmen
belonging to the same club for the whole year. This was my struggle - to try to create
the atmosphere prevalent in a club, with the feeling of belonging, trust and friendship that
lasts throughout the season. I think this made a great impression in Brazil, compared to
other squads that had drawn players from different clubs who formed cliques that split the
squad. And I made sure this did not happen to us. So, whenever we trained, although each
one had his own ideas about training, we managed to make effortless progress with a
unified tactical approach thanks to the mutual feeling of togetherness and motivation. I
passed my ideas on to the boys with ease and any difficulties that arose soon faded away.
This translated to the pitch during the game. Brazil played consistently and communication
with the players was easy. And they were very relaxed with one another. This gave the Brazilian
squad extra strength.
How would you describe Luiz Felipe Scolari’s technical and personal characteristics exactly?
Who is the coach of the world champions and how does he think?
Scolari:
I don’t enjoy talking about myself very much … First of all, I value loyalty. I am
very loyal to whoever works with me and to whoever is at my side. And I put my whole
heart into this squad. I felt great affection for them as well as trust. Some coaches and
many people do not attach much importance to this factor but this is the way I view football.
I believe that this attitude is very useful when it is necessary to overcome difficulties or complications
on the pitch or in the dressing-room. What do I mean by that? Just remember what
happened in the match against England, when we were one goal down. By looking each one
of the players in the eyes during the half-time break and talking to them, we managed to
gather the strength that led us to victory. Of course, we worked on tactics but the secret of
our success lay in the feeling of unity, mutual trust and, above all, the sense of calm that this
feeling engendered in the hearts and heads of the players. So it was because of this – and
nothing else – that the Brazilians released their creativity loose and played in top form.
That was the way we won the match. That is how you have to work with Brazilian football.
We surmounted every obstacle because of the good atmosphere among us. I must say
that technique is important and must be well thought out but technique alone is not
enough. What happens if a player miscontrols the ball in a move on the pitch, watched by millions
of people? His emotional reaction must be calmed quickly with constant encouragement
so as to smooth away the tricky moments in a game and to alleviate the 45 days of concentration
and pressure without seeing his family. Brazil always feels the need to win and
in a World Cup this pressure is multiplied by a factor of one thousand. It is not easy for a
player from a humble background to defend his country. This yellow and green jersey is
sacred and a heavy burden for those who wear it. That is why I sometimes put technique and
tactics aside, even when there was not much time to work, to concentrate on the human element.
I reached this decision after examining the components in the squad. The intention
was to place the big stars on an equal footing with the less well-known, for instance, treating
a Ronaldo the same as a Kleberson. In the end,all of us ended up stronger, as true friends, like
a family. And world champions.
What criteria did you use to choose the Brazilian players?
Scolari:
Well, the main criterion was the following.First of all, I devised a strategy, a style
of play for my team. Then I imagined the ideal group, the ideal players for the positions in
the team. I pondered this point for ages, telling myself: “So... I have those players... and
those..., then, if this one lets me down or that one is injured, who will I take...?” And I began
to set up a basic formation with different alternatives. Before calling up the final 23 players,
I worked out every possible configuration for the World Cup. I used very technical methods
to make the choice, trying to give substance to the idea that I had in mind. But at the
same time, I carefully analysed each player’s personal traits– something that I believe is of
fundamental importance. The player can be the best in the world but if he does not have
a good character, good personality and the ability to gel with a group, he can’t help me.
The personal element carried a lot of weight in my final decision. Let’s imagine the following
situation. I had to choose between two players for a certain position. First of all, I analysed
who would best fit into my tactical scheme. Then I examined his character and ability to
work under pressure. This is how I built up my final list of players.
But, apart from character, what is the secret
of this group of players?
Scolari:
From the technical point of view, Ipreferred the player capable of easing into
two or more positions in my tactical plan. It was something I demanded of myself. What
is more, I looked for players capable of coping with the game themselves and the least rough
and tough candidates possible – the opposite of what most people expect. I was convinced
that this World Cup would be won through great individual play. And Brazil have the players
capable of playing this way.
Did you analyse the international game before leaving for Asia?
Scolari:
I carried out a detailed analysis. I realized that football is levelling out as each day
goes by. There is more power, more speed and endless physical training. There are more and
more well balanced games because the teams are physically fit and tactically similar. This is
where individual and technical skills count. I was absolutely convinced of one thing - that in
this World Cup, individual skills would decide the matches. And so it was. Something that
everybody noticed was that some footballers scored after solo moves and clinched victory
for the team in this way. But it must be remembered that, before this magical finishing touch
can be applied, the team must be tactically prepared and ready to confront any opponent.
It is then that great players are free to do what they do best – spring surprises on their opponents
and delight the crowd. This is exactly what happened at the World Cup. Don’t forget
that although European domestic championships lasted a long time, the Brazilian league
was still underway and I didn’t have much time to prepare my team. For this reason,
more than ever, I was obliged to choose those players with the greatest technical potential
capable of occupying two or three positions in any tactical strategy.
How did you plan training for the team and what were your objectives during the period before the World Cup?
Scolari:
Our aim was the following - to enable the team to develop a distinctive identity
after the last two friendlies before the World Cup. After I had finally assembled the squad
in May, I began to realise how important this team identity was. We played against one
strong team, from Catalonia, and one weak side, from Malaysia. It was imperative to win
both matches so as to boost the players’ confidence before the World Cup. We had very
little time, which made it all the more difficult. Sometimes we ignored the technique and
tactics such as when we spent four whole days on the players’ physical and medical
examinations. The aim of this was to obviate any physical problems during the World
Cup. We sacrificed coaching for four or five precious days so as to ensure we had a perfectly
fit team. I went through this willingly to avoid problems during the competition. And
the results speak for themselves. Brazil were fantastically fit – perhaps one of the fittest
squads of all. And there were no injuries. What is more, this type of preparation helped me to
demand much more of the players during the World Cup. The difference between Brazil and
the other teams became evident in the second half of the matches. Several players from the
big clubs in Europe were not in peak condition whereas Roberto Carlos and Cafu, who played
in the same matches as the other European players, finished the World Cup in top form.
Emerson was the only one who couldn’t keep going but that was an act of fate, not an injury
inflicted by an outside force. In short, before the first game in the World Cup, everyone was
aware of the tactical, technical and physical goals. Add all of this to what I told you before
about the personal and human aspects, in addition to the positive atmosphere we created,
and Brazil’s performance in this World Cup becomes clear.
Bongarts
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Mexxx
What the MIND of MAN can conceive and BELIEVE he will ACHIEVE |
Edited by - Mexxx on Feb 21 2003 3:56:55 PM
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Karl
Senior Member
USA
914 Posts |
Posted - Feb 21 2003 : 11:19:56 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Mexxx
Overall Analysis
The Fine Line
At the top level of football, in an era when teams are often evenly matched, the fine line between winning and losing can be the result of any of the following:
• a decision by a coach, e.g. Senol Gunes, the Turkish coach, made a pivotal decision when he replaced his captain, Hakan Sukur, with Ilhan Mansiz, after 67 minutes, against Senegal – Mansiz proved to be the matchwinner with his Golden Goal strike;
• an individual action, e.g. Ronaldo’s solo effort against Turkey in the semi-final (players who can make and take chances without assistance are vital in the modern game);
• a counter-attack, e.g. Senegal’s winner in the opening game against France;
• a set piece, e.g. Batistuta’s winning header from a back-post corner against Nigeria;
• a mistake, e.g. miskick by Turkish goalkeeper Rustu that led to Brazil’s match-winning penalty in Ulsan. For the national coach, the importance of these elements is considerable.
Technical Committee gives positive review of 2002 FIFA World Cup™
Zürich, 2 November 2002 - In today’s meeting at the FIFA headquarters, the Technical Committee, chaired by Michel Platini (France), gave an excellent review of the 2002 World Cup. The almost seamless organisation of all aspects of the tournament was much emphasised, as was the exceptionally friendly and peaceable atmosphere during the competition and the model behaviour of the fans. All of this had an impact on players, coaches and officials alike.
The committee also dealt with the FIFA technical report, which explores all technical and tactical aspects of the tournament (see www.fifa.com). Overall it appeared that football was played to a higher standard and that supposedly smaller teams made massive gains in terms of self-confidence.
As for tournament preparations, it had been recommended that teams ideally should begin their groundwork five weeks prior to the start of the competition, with a bottom-end time-span of no less than three weeks. Even those teams who had adapted most quickly to the relatively short preparation time available and who had favoured individually tailored training did not show signs of physical or psychological fatigue.
“ I am delighted about this extremely positive evaluation,” said FIFA President, Joseph S. Blatter. “Despite several bad omens, and regardless of unfavourable global economic conditions, the World Cup belied all the pessimistic prophesies and was a flaming beacon to the values of Fair Play, respect, and mutual understanding throughout the world.“
The committee was furthermore informed about a variety of measures to ensure the expansion, modernisation and enhancement of the FIFA Goal development programme, the Financial Assistance Programme, and COM-Unity.
Several suggestions were also put forward regarding the future of refereeing. Increased dialogue between match officials, and players and coaches was a must, and the organisation of referees within FIFA, the confederations, and the national associations had to be better integrated. The FIFA President pledged to develop corresponding initiatives. Steps taken to invite input to the Referees’ Committee from experts without a refereeing background were warmly welcomed. The proposed experiment to place an additional referee behind each set of goals during one or more of next year’s FIFA competitions also met with approval. Moreover, it was agreed that referee teams (trios) that had already officiated together should be engaged at the top level.
As the Players’ Status Committee and the Football Committee discussed earlier this week (see the corresponding press releases on www.fifa.com), the Technical Committee also broached a possible change in the regulations regarding young dual-nationality players’ eligibility to participate in national and representative sides. The members responded positively to the suggestion in the first instance, but noted that clear-cut criteria would have to be implemented.
Finally, the members agreed to Platini’s proposal that even during matches played without the presence of a fourth official, the amount of additional time decided upon by the referee should be announced by the delegates. This was suggested mainly for safety reasons. Further information and instructions on this issue will be prepared for the national associations within the next few weeks.
FIFA Communications Division
Zurich, 2. November 2002
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Enquiries to be addressed to:
FIFA Media Office
Tel: +41-1/254 9800
Fax: +41-1/384 9696
FIFA Communications Division
Zürich, 2 November 2002
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FIFA World Cup 2002 : A Summarized Analysis
