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The political post-mortem of the PNP
Christopher Burns
Monday, October 01, 2007
Inevitably, there will be endless political post-mortems about the happenings of September 3, 2007, which caused the People's National Party to lose the election.
Christopher Burns
Already, several pundits and a few dejected comrades have cast full blame at the feet of PNP president, Portia Simpson Miller, with some even attributing the PNP's defeat entirely to her presence. While the buck stops with the leader, the apparent rush to judgement is premature and unfair.
It is also ironic that while many of these political pathologists sought to establish cause-and-effect relationships, they stayed clear of scrutinising the crevasses of the political stomach where compelling evidence resides. Yet, they have issued definitive conclusions about the causes of the electoral passing of the PNP. This is interesting, because their failure to scrutinise this vital political organ makes it impossible to draw useful parallels between the party's normal organisational anatomy and the results of their post-mortems.
In other words, because they have addressed neither the condition of the party's pre-election organisation nor the immediate or distant environmental peculiarities in which the elections took place, they are really in no position to cast full blame on any one individual without apportioning equal responsibility to the PNP as a collective. After all, sometimes it takes an armada of ants to carry an ounce of food across the lawn.
One is yet to hear, for example, something meaningful about the symbiotic relationship between negative antecedents such as crime and poor governance that plagued the PNP government between 1997 and 2007, and its recent defeat. Acknowledgment of these pre-existing conditions is salient in any objective post-election analysis, because they form important parts of the reasons for the outcome.
Despite this, many have still been unable to resist the allure of recommending various solutions to the party, including the immediate removal of Portia Simpson Miller from the presidency, however politically ill-advised or incongruent to the desires of party delegates. In the absence of good clinical assessments of the antecedents, it would be reasonable to postpone the premature political obituaries.
That aside, a cursory glance at the statistics suggests that the shift from the PNP started after it won the 1997 general elections. This seems to have escaped the attention of Arnold Bertram, one of Simpson Miller's harshest critics, whose disappointing performance against political neophyte Verna Parchment in North West St Ann in 2002 and abysmal performance as member of parliament shocked the party. As it now stands, the JLP has established a reasonable foothold in that constituency.
According to official statistics posted by the Electoral Office of Jamaica, in the 1997 general elections, the PNP received 429,805 votes to the JLP's 297,387; a margin of 132,418 votes. However, by the time the 2002 elections were held, the PNP's popular vote support waned considerably with only 35,872 separating both parties. In that election, the PNP received 396,590 votes to the JLP's 360,718 votes, thus representing a reduced margin in popular vote support for the PNP of 33,215 and a gain in popular votes for the JLP of 63,331 votes.
In the 2007 general elections, the Jamaica Labour Party received 405,215 votes while the PNP received 402,275; a close margin of 2,940 votes. While very close, indeed, the results represent an overall increase of 44,497 votes for the JLP over its 2002 performance, but a less dramatic performance for the PNP of 5,685 votes. What is inescapable, however, is the magnificent cumulative performance in popular vote support for the JLP over the 10-year period.
The net vote gain for the JLP over this period amounts to 107,828, while the PNP suffered a net loss in popular vote support of 27,530 over the same period. Prima facie, a significant portion of the 44,497 additional votes the JLP got in 2007 may reflect that party's enumeration and canvassing strategies going into the election. The PNP, on the other hand, will have to review the likely reasons for its paltry gain of only 5,685 additional votes over its 1997 tally.
As we examine the fundamentals which led to the PNP's defeat, it might also be instructive to study the enumeration strategy it employed. And in terms of seat count, the review should include changes to constituency boundaries since they might have affected the outcome of the elections.
I feel strongly, too, that the PNP suffered the effects of unintended consequences, which reminds me somewhat of the current situation with the production of ethanol (clean fuel) and the soaring price of corn. Although corn is the only viable source of ethanol now, it remains a major food source for millions who are now feeling the corn price pinch.
In the PNP's case, its fight against narco-trafficking and its rickety "just-in-time" communication strategy come readily to mind. Undoubtedly, the dent in the drug trade affected many who would normally have voted PNP, especially in the west. Though well-intentioned, the "just-in-time" communication platform kept the government out of touch with the people. There were times when the public yearned for information and clarifications, but government ministers ignored them as though they, the ministers, were not servants of the people.
The PNP also became a victim of its own success and focused too much on electioneering and too little on being idea- and people-centric. Undoubtedly, the abandonment of focus to prevent and to cure national problems affected the party's chances. Additionally, several non-performing members of parliament had already done such irreparable harm to the reputation of the party and to the expectations of their constituents that even if Mrs Simpson Miller had "turned water into wine" the results would, most likely, have been the same.
Burnscg@aol.com
Christopher Burns
Monday, October 01, 2007
Inevitably, there will be endless political post-mortems about the happenings of September 3, 2007, which caused the People's National Party to lose the election.
Christopher Burns Already, several pundits and a few dejected comrades have cast full blame at the feet of PNP president, Portia Simpson Miller, with some even attributing the PNP's defeat entirely to her presence. While the buck stops with the leader, the apparent rush to judgement is premature and unfair.
It is also ironic that while many of these political pathologists sought to establish cause-and-effect relationships, they stayed clear of scrutinising the crevasses of the political stomach where compelling evidence resides. Yet, they have issued definitive conclusions about the causes of the electoral passing of the PNP. This is interesting, because their failure to scrutinise this vital political organ makes it impossible to draw useful parallels between the party's normal organisational anatomy and the results of their post-mortems.
In other words, because they have addressed neither the condition of the party's pre-election organisation nor the immediate or distant environmental peculiarities in which the elections took place, they are really in no position to cast full blame on any one individual without apportioning equal responsibility to the PNP as a collective. After all, sometimes it takes an armada of ants to carry an ounce of food across the lawn.
One is yet to hear, for example, something meaningful about the symbiotic relationship between negative antecedents such as crime and poor governance that plagued the PNP government between 1997 and 2007, and its recent defeat. Acknowledgment of these pre-existing conditions is salient in any objective post-election analysis, because they form important parts of the reasons for the outcome.
Despite this, many have still been unable to resist the allure of recommending various solutions to the party, including the immediate removal of Portia Simpson Miller from the presidency, however politically ill-advised or incongruent to the desires of party delegates. In the absence of good clinical assessments of the antecedents, it would be reasonable to postpone the premature political obituaries.
That aside, a cursory glance at the statistics suggests that the shift from the PNP started after it won the 1997 general elections. This seems to have escaped the attention of Arnold Bertram, one of Simpson Miller's harshest critics, whose disappointing performance against political neophyte Verna Parchment in North West St Ann in 2002 and abysmal performance as member of parliament shocked the party. As it now stands, the JLP has established a reasonable foothold in that constituency.
According to official statistics posted by the Electoral Office of Jamaica, in the 1997 general elections, the PNP received 429,805 votes to the JLP's 297,387; a margin of 132,418 votes. However, by the time the 2002 elections were held, the PNP's popular vote support waned considerably with only 35,872 separating both parties. In that election, the PNP received 396,590 votes to the JLP's 360,718 votes, thus representing a reduced margin in popular vote support for the PNP of 33,215 and a gain in popular votes for the JLP of 63,331 votes.
In the 2007 general elections, the Jamaica Labour Party received 405,215 votes while the PNP received 402,275; a close margin of 2,940 votes. While very close, indeed, the results represent an overall increase of 44,497 votes for the JLP over its 2002 performance, but a less dramatic performance for the PNP of 5,685 votes. What is inescapable, however, is the magnificent cumulative performance in popular vote support for the JLP over the 10-year period.
The net vote gain for the JLP over this period amounts to 107,828, while the PNP suffered a net loss in popular vote support of 27,530 over the same period. Prima facie, a significant portion of the 44,497 additional votes the JLP got in 2007 may reflect that party's enumeration and canvassing strategies going into the election. The PNP, on the other hand, will have to review the likely reasons for its paltry gain of only 5,685 additional votes over its 1997 tally.
As we examine the fundamentals which led to the PNP's defeat, it might also be instructive to study the enumeration strategy it employed. And in terms of seat count, the review should include changes to constituency boundaries since they might have affected the outcome of the elections.
I feel strongly, too, that the PNP suffered the effects of unintended consequences, which reminds me somewhat of the current situation with the production of ethanol (clean fuel) and the soaring price of corn. Although corn is the only viable source of ethanol now, it remains a major food source for millions who are now feeling the corn price pinch.
In the PNP's case, its fight against narco-trafficking and its rickety "just-in-time" communication strategy come readily to mind. Undoubtedly, the dent in the drug trade affected many who would normally have voted PNP, especially in the west. Though well-intentioned, the "just-in-time" communication platform kept the government out of touch with the people. There were times when the public yearned for information and clarifications, but government ministers ignored them as though they, the ministers, were not servants of the people.
The PNP also became a victim of its own success and focused too much on electioneering and too little on being idea- and people-centric. Undoubtedly, the abandonment of focus to prevent and to cure national problems affected the party's chances. Additionally, several non-performing members of parliament had already done such irreparable harm to the reputation of the party and to the expectations of their constituents that even if Mrs Simpson Miller had "turned water into wine" the results would, most likely, have been the same.
Burnscg@aol.com
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