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WHY JLP LOST - Election Autopsy Report Blames Bruce, Andrew And Others For 2011 Defeat
Published: Sunday | November 3, 2013
From left: Dr Horace Chang, Dorothy Lightbourne, Pearnel Charles, Audley Shaw and then Prime Minister Bruce Golding at Jamaica Labour Party's 67th Annual Conference held at the National Arena in 2010. - File
Erica Virtue, Senior Gleaner Writer
Poor, ineffective and disconnected leadership and disunity within the ranks of Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) were among 25 reasons cited by the strategic review commission which was tasked by party leader Andrew Holness to explain its 2011 general-election loss.
The report, which Holness commissioned in May 2012, is finally slated to be released to officers of the party this week, but The Sunday Gleaner managed to get a sneak peek at the more than 150-page document in advance of the release.
The report paints a picture of a party in total disarray in 2011, and the five-member review team found that the timing of the general election was the final nail in the party's coffin.
"The JLP's inability to win re-election in 2011 was due, essentially, to weaknesses in political conduct during its term in office, of which the (Christopher) Coke extradition fiasco was a prime example … ," concluded the report of the team headed by Bernard Headley, professor of sociology, psychology and social work at the University of the West Indies, Mona.
The commissioners in the executive summary said a lesser fiasco was the unpreparedness for a general election that the "party leadership had itself called".
According to the report, the timing of the general election, which was called by party leader Holness, was a contributory factor to the failure of the JLP to successfully defeat the People's National Party.
HOLNESS LIKED BUT …
The report added that Holness was liked and respected and had a high degree of trust from the party base, and "has the legitimacy and, more importantly, the credibility to act, … but will need to work to prove himself worthy of the trust of the party".
However, concerns were raised that "the party leader (Holness) is too soft and needed to be more assertive", with a suggestion that he be more like Edward Seaga, since he was "coached" by Seaga, who served as JLP leader from 1974 to 2005.
"The matter of who the party leader listens to is a concern for those who the review team spoke to. It was often suggested that [those in] the party leader's inner circle are either not trustworthy or are people who themselves do not have the trust of the majority of the party.
"There is a suggestion that the party leader is easily influenced and might, in some cases, be regarded as easily manipulated," read a section of the report.
The report said party sources were concerned that since the 1980s, the JLP had become increasingly managerial, more macroeconomic, and fronted by more "brown man".
Supporters said the JLP was "not the party of the majority of black Jamaicans" and had moved away from the party of organised labour that had a close affiliation with the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union.
INHERENT THEMES
The report stated in bold print that "the divide-and-rule mentality, disunity, lack of party cohesiveness, arrogant candidates, lack of teamwork, and a top-heavy hierarchical structure were all themes inherent throughout".
It said: "Four unmistakable lessons learnt (or should have been learned) emerged from the commission's various interviews and conversations."
The party was blamed for not demonstrating humility during its time in government.
The report further claimed that the JLP had not demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the people's pain, and neither prime ministers Bruce Golding nor Andrew Holness explained properly how the short-term pain would bring long-term gain.
Golding was battered in the report for showing "a lack of astuteness in his handling of the extradition of now-convicted racketeer Coke".
"Party leader Bruce Golding should have been astute enough to recognise, and then avoid an undertaking that ended up inflicting the kind of gratuitous political damage that the Christopher Coke extradition matter did … ," the report said in part.
The commissioners also recommended that should a similar situation arise, the matter should move quickly to the judiciary.
According to the report, Labourites at the base of the party expressed feelings of devaluation because of an unwillingness to involve them in decision making. It said individuals cited the JLP as "a very selfish and uncaring party as members only seek to look out for their own self-interests".
That was said to be one of the party's biggest failures, which led to the 2011 electoral wipeout.
Grass-roots Labourites also knocked the decision-making structures within the party, and gave it the flak for not paying attention to criticisms about individuals in positions of influence.
The report said Labourites felt that the strength of the party resides in its capacity to manage the affairs of the country, keep promises and accomplish identified tasks, engage less in corrupt practices, and headed by a competent, trustworthy leader.
The grass-roots Labourites also suggested quarterly meetings, more involvement from Generation 2000 (G2K) through regular and structured meetings, greater visibility, and more visits to constituencies by the leaders as measures which would benefit the party in future.
Bread-and-butter issues ignored
Several supporters of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), who were canvassed and interviewed by members of the team established to review its 2011 general-election loss, expressed high levels of frustration, desperation and anger with the party's handling of "bottom-line, bread-and-butter issues".
These issues were more important to the Labourities than economic stabilisation, the removal of hospital user fees, and other JLP government initiatives.
The commissioners said that People's National Party's bread-and-butter platform and the Jamaica Emergency Employment Programme (JEEP) crashed into the JLP.
According to the report, then Prime Minister Andrew Holness' announcement during the campaign that "bitter medicine was coming" did not signal hope and, instead, sent ripples of fear within the ranks of party supporters.
There was also some perception that the JLP was "not a party that cares for the ordinary grass-roots Jamaican, but was more concerned with brown and rich people".
25 reasons for JLP's 2011 election defeat
1. Poor leadership structure, systems, and processes
2. Ineffective and indecisive leadership
3. Limited awareness about the party leader among voters
4. Disconnected leader (leader disconnected from the base and party members)
5. Disunity within the party
6. Lack of succession planning
7. Neglected and disillusioned base
8. Low voter turnout
9. Failure to address 'bread-and-butter issues'
10. Lack of funds
11. Timing of the election
12. Personality and character of candidates
13. Poor media-management skills
14. Limited support for candidates
15. Effects of the global economic crisis
16. Weak marketing and public-relations strategy
17. Ineffective public-relations system
18. Poor internal communication structure
19. Faulty candidate selection
20. The Coke-Manatt debacle
21. Weak party machinery
22. Absence of party renewal
23. Political education and training
24. Gender marginalisation
25. Anti-intellectualism.
Published: Sunday | November 3, 2013
From left: Dr Horace Chang, Dorothy Lightbourne, Pearnel Charles, Audley Shaw and then Prime Minister Bruce Golding at Jamaica Labour Party's 67th Annual Conference held at the National Arena in 2010. - File
Erica Virtue, Senior Gleaner Writer
Poor, ineffective and disconnected leadership and disunity within the ranks of Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) were among 25 reasons cited by the strategic review commission which was tasked by party leader Andrew Holness to explain its 2011 general-election loss.
The report, which Holness commissioned in May 2012, is finally slated to be released to officers of the party this week, but The Sunday Gleaner managed to get a sneak peek at the more than 150-page document in advance of the release.
The report paints a picture of a party in total disarray in 2011, and the five-member review team found that the timing of the general election was the final nail in the party's coffin.
"The JLP's inability to win re-election in 2011 was due, essentially, to weaknesses in political conduct during its term in office, of which the (Christopher) Coke extradition fiasco was a prime example … ," concluded the report of the team headed by Bernard Headley, professor of sociology, psychology and social work at the University of the West Indies, Mona.
The commissioners in the executive summary said a lesser fiasco was the unpreparedness for a general election that the "party leadership had itself called".
According to the report, the timing of the general election, which was called by party leader Holness, was a contributory factor to the failure of the JLP to successfully defeat the People's National Party.
HOLNESS LIKED BUT …
The report added that Holness was liked and respected and had a high degree of trust from the party base, and "has the legitimacy and, more importantly, the credibility to act, … but will need to work to prove himself worthy of the trust of the party".
However, concerns were raised that "the party leader (Holness) is too soft and needed to be more assertive", with a suggestion that he be more like Edward Seaga, since he was "coached" by Seaga, who served as JLP leader from 1974 to 2005.
"The matter of who the party leader listens to is a concern for those who the review team spoke to. It was often suggested that [those in] the party leader's inner circle are either not trustworthy or are people who themselves do not have the trust of the majority of the party.
"There is a suggestion that the party leader is easily influenced and might, in some cases, be regarded as easily manipulated," read a section of the report.
The report said party sources were concerned that since the 1980s, the JLP had become increasingly managerial, more macroeconomic, and fronted by more "brown man".
Supporters said the JLP was "not the party of the majority of black Jamaicans" and had moved away from the party of organised labour that had a close affiliation with the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union.
INHERENT THEMES
The report stated in bold print that "the divide-and-rule mentality, disunity, lack of party cohesiveness, arrogant candidates, lack of teamwork, and a top-heavy hierarchical structure were all themes inherent throughout".
It said: "Four unmistakable lessons learnt (or should have been learned) emerged from the commission's various interviews and conversations."
The party was blamed for not demonstrating humility during its time in government.
The report further claimed that the JLP had not demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the people's pain, and neither prime ministers Bruce Golding nor Andrew Holness explained properly how the short-term pain would bring long-term gain.
Golding was battered in the report for showing "a lack of astuteness in his handling of the extradition of now-convicted racketeer Coke".
"Party leader Bruce Golding should have been astute enough to recognise, and then avoid an undertaking that ended up inflicting the kind of gratuitous political damage that the Christopher Coke extradition matter did … ," the report said in part.
The commissioners also recommended that should a similar situation arise, the matter should move quickly to the judiciary.
According to the report, Labourites at the base of the party expressed feelings of devaluation because of an unwillingness to involve them in decision making. It said individuals cited the JLP as "a very selfish and uncaring party as members only seek to look out for their own self-interests".
That was said to be one of the party's biggest failures, which led to the 2011 electoral wipeout.
Grass-roots Labourites also knocked the decision-making structures within the party, and gave it the flak for not paying attention to criticisms about individuals in positions of influence.
The report said Labourites felt that the strength of the party resides in its capacity to manage the affairs of the country, keep promises and accomplish identified tasks, engage less in corrupt practices, and headed by a competent, trustworthy leader.
The grass-roots Labourites also suggested quarterly meetings, more involvement from Generation 2000 (G2K) through regular and structured meetings, greater visibility, and more visits to constituencies by the leaders as measures which would benefit the party in future.
Bread-and-butter issues ignored
Several supporters of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), who were canvassed and interviewed by members of the team established to review its 2011 general-election loss, expressed high levels of frustration, desperation and anger with the party's handling of "bottom-line, bread-and-butter issues".
These issues were more important to the Labourities than economic stabilisation, the removal of hospital user fees, and other JLP government initiatives.
The commissioners said that People's National Party's bread-and-butter platform and the Jamaica Emergency Employment Programme (JEEP) crashed into the JLP.
According to the report, then Prime Minister Andrew Holness' announcement during the campaign that "bitter medicine was coming" did not signal hope and, instead, sent ripples of fear within the ranks of party supporters.
There was also some perception that the JLP was "not a party that cares for the ordinary grass-roots Jamaican, but was more concerned with brown and rich people".
25 reasons for JLP's 2011 election defeat
1. Poor leadership structure, systems, and processes
2. Ineffective and indecisive leadership
3. Limited awareness about the party leader among voters
4. Disconnected leader (leader disconnected from the base and party members)
5. Disunity within the party
6. Lack of succession planning
7. Neglected and disillusioned base
8. Low voter turnout
9. Failure to address 'bread-and-butter issues'
10. Lack of funds
11. Timing of the election
12. Personality and character of candidates
13. Poor media-management skills
14. Limited support for candidates
15. Effects of the global economic crisis
16. Weak marketing and public-relations strategy
17. Ineffective public-relations system
18. Poor internal communication structure
19. Faulty candidate selection
20. The Coke-Manatt debacle
21. Weak party machinery
22. Absence of party renewal
23. Political education and training
24. Gender marginalisation
25. Anti-intellectualism.
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