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As background let me just state that Tivoli Gardens has long been protected by its brainchild, Eddie Seaga, former Prime Minister of Jamaica (1980-1989). With its south to the coastal area of Kingston, Tivoli as the main garrison pocket in the JLP controlled Kingston Western constituency is ringed on the east, the west and the north by PNP garrison constituencies.
The common thread running through these constituencies are the persistent poverty of the residents and the manipulation by their political masters into a long lifetime of accepting their underclass status. Then there are the guns, initially distributed by the politicians to corral the vote and to protect the constituency from armed political marauders from outside its borders.
It is somewhat of a chicken-and-egg scenario in trying to define Tivoli’s gun culture. Which came first? Did Tivoli first arm itself and for what reason? Did Tivoli arm itself as a direct response to armed marauding elements from the other PNP garrisons?
From the 1970’s to the present times, we have seen important shits in the relationship between the political masters and the gunmen in these garrisons. As the inner city toughs began to tire of their social relegation to chaff, they had reason to use but to ease aside the grip the party politics had on them.
As drugs from South America made its way across Jamaica in transit to the US eastern and Southern coastal areas and urban centres, the gunmen (and later, dons) grabbed a bigger share of the illicit trade in drugs and refused to be the continuing surrogates for shady businessmen/politicians.
By the 1990’s the politicians could no longer dictate terms because the criminal don and his army of gunmen were too powerful for him. Still, the political garrison provided the perfect cover for the don trading in ganja and cocaine and he now found that he was able to assist in funding the political process all in an effort to keep that cover intact.
The dilemma facing a garrison holder like Seaga was, up until 2005, he could not be half way in and half way out. This is a dynamic that many ‘law abiding citizens’ who fear the painful truth, will never understand.
When Seaga stood up for the non-armed, lawful citizens of Tivoli, he was forced to accept the baby with the dirty bath water. In practical terms, he could never agitate for the disarming of Tivoli because the PNP, historically adept at hurling barbs at him as part of its successful political strategy, was never prepared to disarm the PNP garrisons.
Across election cycles, the gun culture in Tivoli eventually shifted more to the protection and the maintenance of the power of the don and his business interests, politically and non-politically connected. But, as long as Seaga was the political representative, he would continue, at the national level to agitate for and protect Tivoli and its sister community, Denham Town from the increasing inroads by hostile PNP gangs and raids by the security forces while at street level, the guns in Tivoli would keep the soldiers and police on the outer periphery of the JLP communities.
In time, much hate and fear developed between Tivoli and the security forces. One part of this relationship saw the security forces as ‘accepting’ that every young man inside Tivoli Gardens was a potential gunman. It didn't help that even some law abiding women who lived there but worked outside the community in offices were forced to stash the guns belonging to posse members in their bed linens and among their dainty little clothing items.
The only other choice they had was to leave the community and live in fear of the extensive reach of Tivoli gunmen whose main effectiveness outside of ‘war’ times, was creating ‘business openings,’ extortion, taking hit jobs and pushing back against PNP political interests in constituencies far afield.
Tivoli eventually took on ‘satanic’ status especially among the disconnected middle class and pseudo-social conscience folk leading certain civil society groupings who feigned love for the poor. The PNP exploited this while pretending that there was no beam in its eyes. The nation lapped it up, and, in knee-jerk responses, called for something known as the ‘dismantling of garrisons’ and, the PNP kept on its roll of winning elections by linking ‘satanic’ Seaga to the evils of Tivoli Gardens.
Media seeking sound-bites and not substance?
Based on what I have heard so far from some of our more established journalists, it appears that Mr. Witter’s report will be not enough to satisfy them wanting blood squeezed out of a stone.
I will admit that we all wanted this Report to be all things to all people. I may be on the wrong side of history but I have found the report to be a most powerful document, that is, if we are not searching for the ‘sexy bits’ of it that make for exciting clips on radio and television.
The PD must have been seized with some prescience when he wrote on page ix of the pre-introduction to the report, ‘…the Public Defender makes a humble appeal to Jamaican journalists: in communicating these contents, please do strive for the standards of accuracy, sensitivity, proficiency, professionalism, taste and excellence…’
Of course I am prepared to yield to these journalists as I am but a mere columnist untrained in knowing which questions to pluck out of the sky or, which particular triviality to designate as most important. In the end, we are all trying to discover where truth lies and to follow that path.
In attaching numbers to the terrible atrocity, in the Introduction, it is stated, ‘This Interim Report concerns continuing investigations undertaken by the Public Defender (aided by a special one-off budgetary allocation,) into events which led to the greatest loss of life in a single State Security Forces operation in independent Jamaica: seventy-six (76) civilians and one (1) soldier. A table listing all civilian deceased whose death is attributable to action taken by those Forces, or by others, is attached as Appendix 1. Of the seventy-six, the Public Defender is investigating complaints that forty-four (44) are instances of extra-judicial killings (unjustifiable homicide.) They are listed in Appendix 2.
‘In addition, investigations have turned up five (5) cases of missing persons, (pp. 83 - 85 post) four (4) of them extant, the corpse of one (1) of them now having been positively identified by DNA analysis. Those four may yet be presumed dead, according to law. Four (4) male corpses remaining unidentified may be theirs. If not, the known civilian body count attributable to relevant activities would rise to eighty (80) and the overall death toll to eighty-one (81).’
One basic role of the Public Defender is set out on page 16. “If the Public Defender finds, during the conduct of his investigations or on the conclusion thereof, that there is evidence of a breach of duty, or misconduct, or criminal offence on the part of an officer or member of any authority, he shall refer the matter to the person or body of persons competent to take such disciplinary or other proceedings as may
be appropriate against that officer or member and in all such cases shall lay a special report before Parliament.”
The PD uses ‘fighting words’ in a country where ‘the authorities’ tend to be more repressive than responsive to the needs of those who they are constitutionally sworn to protect. Additionally even those who are constitutionally given oversight power to investigate them tend to whitewash them. We only need go back to the findings of the Manatt Commission to see a perfect example of that.
The PD states, ‘In relation to both the West Kingston and Keith Clarke operations, the Public Defender submits that the heads of the State Security Forces, the Commissioner of Police and the Chief of Defense Staff, (since retired) and other senior personnel concerned, should be required to testify about their oversight of the operations, before a thorough-going judicial enquiry. The respective roles of those heads in the planning and execution of both operations require to be examined in line with the modern trend of official accountability and transparency as well as for historical purposes.’
He goes further. ‘Obviously, the same is to be said of the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Defense Board of the day, Mr. Golding, as well as the erstwhile Minister of National Security, Mr. Nelson. [As respectfully submitted later in this Report, a duly constituted commission of enquiry is the only appropriate forum.]’
It is quite obvious that a layman’s analysis such as mine cannot be done in one article. Second, in a country where reading is a rare as a ‘pannia jar’, making heavy, legal quotes from the report will only tend to turn off likely readers.
Mr. Witter’s report indicates that the security forces were, (based on the many allegations and the physical state of Tivoli and the many households), while they were on the ground inside Tivoli, on a mission to flatten the garrison pocket.
More importantly, it appears that if they were there to capture Dudus, the use of either incendiary or explosive mortar rounds at the spot where the fugitive was supposed to have been hiding out would indicate that anything but capturing him was the objective.
The man at street level knew that. Dudus knew that and, when his father, ‘Jim Brown’ was ‘accidentally’ burnt to a crisp in his jail cell while awaiting extradition many years before him, he himself must have, in one split second, recognized the danger he was to those who saw him as threats to their social power and existence.
The account of the many atrocities on the ground, the willful destruction of private property (fridges, stoves, television sets etc.) and the complaints that cash was ‘seized’ (stolen) by members of the security forces is a litany of shame that this nation cannot allow to go unaccounted for.
Keith Clarke’s killing
The killing of Keith Clarke at Kirkland Close on May 27, 2010 was, in its description, (as pieced together from the PD’s examinations), a tale of men gone totally mad. Again, based on reports from the security forces that they had information that the fugitive Dudus was at the house with seven other men, it appears that anything but capturing him had been the initial and ultimate objective.
In plain language, it appears that orders were issued (still un-establised) to kill him and, the soldiers who pumped 16 bullets in Clarke’s back and five in other parts of his body actually thought that he was Dudus.
With a total of 65 soldiers gathered for what turned out to be, an operation of nothing less than treachery, how else than that can the death of Clarke be described or explained?
Was his wife not crying out and telling them who she was? Was she not calling the police by telephone? Did the security forces (all 65 making up the lot) all lose their minds or, were they under orders to meet a specific objective?
Then, in the aftermath, how does one explain this at page 121 of the report?
‘The Clarke’s house was virtually laid waste after entry. Not a single room or area escaped the ravages of high-powered gunfire or other explosive devices. The blackened, pockmarked walls and floors littered with chips or chunks of concrete, shards of glass, splintered wood and other debris, wrecked furniture, tapestry, furnishings and grillwork bore unmistakable evidence of that. It was a scene of systematic destruction rendering the premises almost uninhabitable. Naturally, the jaw-dropping experience left Mr. Clarke’s widow and daughter shaken and greatly traumatized. In stunned bewilderment, they took refuge with neighbours.’
From Tivoli Gardens to Kirkland Heights the thread of killings would tend to indicate that the soldiers who were operating were under specific orders in furtherance of a specific objective, (still undetermined) by the ‘authorities’ but laid bare for all to see.
The Public Defender impresses upon us to act and, no less a person than the Prime Minister is being called on.
‘In the event therefore, it is the Most Honourable Mrs. Portia Simpson Miller’s call. Having regard to the ambit of the commission of enquiry here recommended, doing the right thing may require some courage. But there is wise counsel coming from the Right Excellent Marcus Garvey – “Men who are in earnest, are not afraid of consequences.” The “right thing” may be the harbinger of “truth and reconciliation”. Proceedings before such a commission therefore may be as close to that inescapable pass as we shall likely get, in this generation. The opportunity or occasion is not to be missed.’
Next week I will explore more aspects of the Public Defender’s recommendations from his most powerful report plus the philosophical constructs which he has suggested as our road-map to nation building. I will also look at the relationship between politician, don and the politics from the viewpoint of the Public Defender.
For now I say to Mr. Earl Witter, ‘As a public servant, you have served us well. Congrats sir!’
observemark@gmail.com
The common thread running through these constituencies are the persistent poverty of the residents and the manipulation by their political masters into a long lifetime of accepting their underclass status. Then there are the guns, initially distributed by the politicians to corral the vote and to protect the constituency from armed political marauders from outside its borders.
It is somewhat of a chicken-and-egg scenario in trying to define Tivoli’s gun culture. Which came first? Did Tivoli first arm itself and for what reason? Did Tivoli arm itself as a direct response to armed marauding elements from the other PNP garrisons?
From the 1970’s to the present times, we have seen important shits in the relationship between the political masters and the gunmen in these garrisons. As the inner city toughs began to tire of their social relegation to chaff, they had reason to use but to ease aside the grip the party politics had on them.
As drugs from South America made its way across Jamaica in transit to the US eastern and Southern coastal areas and urban centres, the gunmen (and later, dons) grabbed a bigger share of the illicit trade in drugs and refused to be the continuing surrogates for shady businessmen/politicians.
By the 1990’s the politicians could no longer dictate terms because the criminal don and his army of gunmen were too powerful for him. Still, the political garrison provided the perfect cover for the don trading in ganja and cocaine and he now found that he was able to assist in funding the political process all in an effort to keep that cover intact.
The dilemma facing a garrison holder like Seaga was, up until 2005, he could not be half way in and half way out. This is a dynamic that many ‘law abiding citizens’ who fear the painful truth, will never understand.
When Seaga stood up for the non-armed, lawful citizens of Tivoli, he was forced to accept the baby with the dirty bath water. In practical terms, he could never agitate for the disarming of Tivoli because the PNP, historically adept at hurling barbs at him as part of its successful political strategy, was never prepared to disarm the PNP garrisons.
Across election cycles, the gun culture in Tivoli eventually shifted more to the protection and the maintenance of the power of the don and his business interests, politically and non-politically connected. But, as long as Seaga was the political representative, he would continue, at the national level to agitate for and protect Tivoli and its sister community, Denham Town from the increasing inroads by hostile PNP gangs and raids by the security forces while at street level, the guns in Tivoli would keep the soldiers and police on the outer periphery of the JLP communities.
In time, much hate and fear developed between Tivoli and the security forces. One part of this relationship saw the security forces as ‘accepting’ that every young man inside Tivoli Gardens was a potential gunman. It didn't help that even some law abiding women who lived there but worked outside the community in offices were forced to stash the guns belonging to posse members in their bed linens and among their dainty little clothing items.
The only other choice they had was to leave the community and live in fear of the extensive reach of Tivoli gunmen whose main effectiveness outside of ‘war’ times, was creating ‘business openings,’ extortion, taking hit jobs and pushing back against PNP political interests in constituencies far afield.
Tivoli eventually took on ‘satanic’ status especially among the disconnected middle class and pseudo-social conscience folk leading certain civil society groupings who feigned love for the poor. The PNP exploited this while pretending that there was no beam in its eyes. The nation lapped it up, and, in knee-jerk responses, called for something known as the ‘dismantling of garrisons’ and, the PNP kept on its roll of winning elections by linking ‘satanic’ Seaga to the evils of Tivoli Gardens.
Media seeking sound-bites and not substance?
Based on what I have heard so far from some of our more established journalists, it appears that Mr. Witter’s report will be not enough to satisfy them wanting blood squeezed out of a stone.
I will admit that we all wanted this Report to be all things to all people. I may be on the wrong side of history but I have found the report to be a most powerful document, that is, if we are not searching for the ‘sexy bits’ of it that make for exciting clips on radio and television.
The PD must have been seized with some prescience when he wrote on page ix of the pre-introduction to the report, ‘…the Public Defender makes a humble appeal to Jamaican journalists: in communicating these contents, please do strive for the standards of accuracy, sensitivity, proficiency, professionalism, taste and excellence…’
Of course I am prepared to yield to these journalists as I am but a mere columnist untrained in knowing which questions to pluck out of the sky or, which particular triviality to designate as most important. In the end, we are all trying to discover where truth lies and to follow that path.
In attaching numbers to the terrible atrocity, in the Introduction, it is stated, ‘This Interim Report concerns continuing investigations undertaken by the Public Defender (aided by a special one-off budgetary allocation,) into events which led to the greatest loss of life in a single State Security Forces operation in independent Jamaica: seventy-six (76) civilians and one (1) soldier. A table listing all civilian deceased whose death is attributable to action taken by those Forces, or by others, is attached as Appendix 1. Of the seventy-six, the Public Defender is investigating complaints that forty-four (44) are instances of extra-judicial killings (unjustifiable homicide.) They are listed in Appendix 2.
‘In addition, investigations have turned up five (5) cases of missing persons, (pp. 83 - 85 post) four (4) of them extant, the corpse of one (1) of them now having been positively identified by DNA analysis. Those four may yet be presumed dead, according to law. Four (4) male corpses remaining unidentified may be theirs. If not, the known civilian body count attributable to relevant activities would rise to eighty (80) and the overall death toll to eighty-one (81).’
One basic role of the Public Defender is set out on page 16. “If the Public Defender finds, during the conduct of his investigations or on the conclusion thereof, that there is evidence of a breach of duty, or misconduct, or criminal offence on the part of an officer or member of any authority, he shall refer the matter to the person or body of persons competent to take such disciplinary or other proceedings as may
be appropriate against that officer or member and in all such cases shall lay a special report before Parliament.”
The PD uses ‘fighting words’ in a country where ‘the authorities’ tend to be more repressive than responsive to the needs of those who they are constitutionally sworn to protect. Additionally even those who are constitutionally given oversight power to investigate them tend to whitewash them. We only need go back to the findings of the Manatt Commission to see a perfect example of that.
The PD states, ‘In relation to both the West Kingston and Keith Clarke operations, the Public Defender submits that the heads of the State Security Forces, the Commissioner of Police and the Chief of Defense Staff, (since retired) and other senior personnel concerned, should be required to testify about their oversight of the operations, before a thorough-going judicial enquiry. The respective roles of those heads in the planning and execution of both operations require to be examined in line with the modern trend of official accountability and transparency as well as for historical purposes.’
He goes further. ‘Obviously, the same is to be said of the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Defense Board of the day, Mr. Golding, as well as the erstwhile Minister of National Security, Mr. Nelson. [As respectfully submitted later in this Report, a duly constituted commission of enquiry is the only appropriate forum.]’
It is quite obvious that a layman’s analysis such as mine cannot be done in one article. Second, in a country where reading is a rare as a ‘pannia jar’, making heavy, legal quotes from the report will only tend to turn off likely readers.
Mr. Witter’s report indicates that the security forces were, (based on the many allegations and the physical state of Tivoli and the many households), while they were on the ground inside Tivoli, on a mission to flatten the garrison pocket.
More importantly, it appears that if they were there to capture Dudus, the use of either incendiary or explosive mortar rounds at the spot where the fugitive was supposed to have been hiding out would indicate that anything but capturing him was the objective.
The man at street level knew that. Dudus knew that and, when his father, ‘Jim Brown’ was ‘accidentally’ burnt to a crisp in his jail cell while awaiting extradition many years before him, he himself must have, in one split second, recognized the danger he was to those who saw him as threats to their social power and existence.
The account of the many atrocities on the ground, the willful destruction of private property (fridges, stoves, television sets etc.) and the complaints that cash was ‘seized’ (stolen) by members of the security forces is a litany of shame that this nation cannot allow to go unaccounted for.
Keith Clarke’s killing
The killing of Keith Clarke at Kirkland Close on May 27, 2010 was, in its description, (as pieced together from the PD’s examinations), a tale of men gone totally mad. Again, based on reports from the security forces that they had information that the fugitive Dudus was at the house with seven other men, it appears that anything but capturing him had been the initial and ultimate objective.
In plain language, it appears that orders were issued (still un-establised) to kill him and, the soldiers who pumped 16 bullets in Clarke’s back and five in other parts of his body actually thought that he was Dudus.
With a total of 65 soldiers gathered for what turned out to be, an operation of nothing less than treachery, how else than that can the death of Clarke be described or explained?
Was his wife not crying out and telling them who she was? Was she not calling the police by telephone? Did the security forces (all 65 making up the lot) all lose their minds or, were they under orders to meet a specific objective?
Then, in the aftermath, how does one explain this at page 121 of the report?
‘The Clarke’s house was virtually laid waste after entry. Not a single room or area escaped the ravages of high-powered gunfire or other explosive devices. The blackened, pockmarked walls and floors littered with chips or chunks of concrete, shards of glass, splintered wood and other debris, wrecked furniture, tapestry, furnishings and grillwork bore unmistakable evidence of that. It was a scene of systematic destruction rendering the premises almost uninhabitable. Naturally, the jaw-dropping experience left Mr. Clarke’s widow and daughter shaken and greatly traumatized. In stunned bewilderment, they took refuge with neighbours.’
From Tivoli Gardens to Kirkland Heights the thread of killings would tend to indicate that the soldiers who were operating were under specific orders in furtherance of a specific objective, (still undetermined) by the ‘authorities’ but laid bare for all to see.
The Public Defender impresses upon us to act and, no less a person than the Prime Minister is being called on.
‘In the event therefore, it is the Most Honourable Mrs. Portia Simpson Miller’s call. Having regard to the ambit of the commission of enquiry here recommended, doing the right thing may require some courage. But there is wise counsel coming from the Right Excellent Marcus Garvey – “Men who are in earnest, are not afraid of consequences.” The “right thing” may be the harbinger of “truth and reconciliation”. Proceedings before such a commission therefore may be as close to that inescapable pass as we shall likely get, in this generation. The opportunity or occasion is not to be missed.’
Next week I will explore more aspects of the Public Defender’s recommendations from his most powerful report plus the philosophical constructs which he has suggested as our road-map to nation building. I will also look at the relationship between politician, don and the politics from the viewpoint of the Public Defender.
For now I say to Mr. Earl Witter, ‘As a public servant, you have served us well. Congrats sir!’
observemark@gmail.com
one person too far up the chain of command?
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