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It was August, 2009, when the U.S. first asked for the extradition of the Jamaican drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke. More than a year passed before his arrest, in June, 2010.The delay led to a diplomatic crisis and one of the bloodiest episodes in Jamaica’s history. Coke barricaded himself inside of Tivoli Gardens, one of Kingston’s so-called garrison communities, politically homogenous enclaves under the control of local dons. On May 23rd, after sporadic gun battles throughout Kingston and the burning of police stations, the Jamaican security forces went in hard, with armored vehicles and helicopters. They fired mortars at a residential neighborhood that still held thousands of civilians, at least seventy-three of whom were killed in the operation. Many appear to have been unarmed people who were rounded up and massacred after the neighborhood was already under control. As I reported for the magazine in December, the U.S. passed intelligence from a Department of Homeland Security surveillance plane to Jamaican forces. The full extent of U.S. involvement in the operation remains unclear.
At the center of this mess was Jamaica’s then-Prime Minister, Bruce Golding, who also represented Tivoli Gardens as a member of Parliament. Golding spent months delaying the extradition request. His party hired a Washington law firm to lobby against it. Golding has maintained that he was acting on principle and that the wiretap evidence used by the U.S. to indict Coke was illegal under Jamaican law. But many people have argued that Coke had influence over Golding and that Jamaica was on the verge of becoming a narco-state. Hardley Lewin, the former head of Jamaica’s military, has suggested that when the extradition request finally went through, Golding’s administration leaked the news to Coke, giving him time to muster his forces.
Golding resigned from office in October, 2011. I made several attempts to reach him while reporting the original story, and did not receive a response. I sent Golding an e-mail when I returned to Jamaica earlier this summer, and was surprised when he agreed to an interview. This is his first public comment on the killings since leaving office. We spoke for about an hour in his living room, over glasses of juice from the Bombay mango trees that shade his home in the hills of Kingston. The interview has been edited for length and clarity, and one question and answer come from a follow-up e-mail.
Do you feel that anything went wrong during the operation to arrest Coke?
Difficult to say. A large number of persons were killed. And it is evident to me that some of those persons that were killed were not themselves gunmen, were not confronting the security forces. How many of the seventy-three [killed] fall in that category, as distinct from those who were engaging the police in armed confrontation … because that happened, too. There are reports from residents with whom I spoke that some of the persons who were killed were murdered in cold-blooded fashion. I visited a house, for example, where the mother lost two sons—you might have been to that house, too. She took me into the room and showed me where they were put to kneel down. So there was enough in terms of what I was told and what I saw to suggest that an in-depth investigation was necessary.
The U.S. government has repeatedly said that this was a Jamaican operation conducted by Jamaican security forces. Is that statement accurate?
I requested that the U.S. authorities provide us with aerial surveillance. What I had in mind at that time were satellite images of what was happening on the ground. I didn’t get into the technical details. I simply asked the U.S. ambassador whether her government would be able to provide some aerial intelligence that would assist the security forces in managing the operation.
Were there U.S. personnel on the ground in Tivoli Gardens during the operation?
No. I was never told that they were there. I have no such knowledge.
What kind of reports were you getting, as Prime Minster, from the ground as this whole thing was under way?
I would get regular reports from the security forces. I would get a daily written brief in terms of what was happening on the ground—what success they were achieving, what difficulties they were encountering.
Do you have a sense of what their rules of engagement were, or what their parameters were going in?
No, that was an operational matter over which, by law, I have no authority or jurisdiction.
But this was a pretty serious and historical operation—
It was. It was.
As Prime Minister, did you involve yourself in the details of it at all?
They [the security forces] are subject to the rules and the law and the constitution, and, therefore, if in carrying out the operation something is done which is contrary to law, which is in violation of human rights, then they are held accountable. We don’t know what will come of the public defender’s inquiry. I’m surprised that it has not been submitted. When that is submitted, he may very well refer a copy of that to the director of public prosecutions, to be tabled in parliament, and we’ll have to see from that stage whether there is a basis from which any criminal charges should be laid. What is clear is that the security forces faced a serious challenge to the authority of the state.
During the planning and unfolding of the Tivoli operation, did you hear anything in your updates from the security forces that could shed some light on these many allegations of extrajudicial killings?
None of the reports or briefings I received from the security forces acknowledged any unlawful [or] extrajudicial behavior. They would always give the assurance that all credible allegations or charges would be promptly and thoroughly investigated.
After months of challenging the legality of the U.S. request to extradite Coke, you abruptly reversed your position. There has been much speculation in Jamaica about what caused you to change your mind. Can you shed any light on your thinking at that time?
I met with the head of security forces on the morning of that Sunday [May 23rd]. They indicated to me that their intelligence told them that there was a significant and massive buildup of armory and armed men in the area—not only in Tivoli but the adjoining area—and that they were muscling up to prevent any attempt by the security forces to enter the area. [The security forces] recommended to me that to ensure that they can effectively restore law and order, a state of emergency was required.
Were you experiencing diplomatic pressure from the U.S. during this time?
Well, nothing unusual. I mean, there was a lot of U.S. pressure in relation to the extradition of Coke.
And you for a time were resisting processing the extradition—
Yeah, there was that. But there was no pressure in relation to the security forces going into Tivoli Gardens to conduct the operation, no specific—
But at one point you changed your position and said that the extradition order would be signed and processed.
Well, that was because the country was in a crisis, the government was in a crisis, and I had to make a decision. I had to decide whether—much as I believed that the process that was used was wrong, that it was a violation of our laws and our constitution, that it was setting a dangerous precedent—I felt the broader interests of the country would not be served by stubbornly pursuing that position.
So if someone had the perception that your arm was being twisted by the U.S. government during this time, would that perception be wrong?
That would be wrong. The U.S. made it very clear from the beginning of this Coke issue that the extradition of Coke to the United States was an issue of fundamental importance—not at the time when the operation in Tivoli took place, they made that clear from the very beginning, that they attached great importance to Coke’s extradition.
And as you probably know, we said to them, “The process you have used is wrong.” There is a provision in our constitution that guarantees the right to privacy of communication, such as telephone calls. Parliament passed a law that allows that right to be abridged, provided certain things are satisfied. There must be reasonable suspicion that it is necessary in the interest of public safety, the pursuit of criminals, and so on. But parliament was so cautious in allowing that right to be abridged that parliament said, “Before you can do that you must go to a judge of the Supreme Court, present your case, and get the judge to authorize it.”
So your argument was procedural.
We said to the United States, “These are violations that have taken place. We cannot abide these violations. We will hold the extradition request, we are not going to refuse [it]. We will hold it. We simply ask you to send a new request that is in conformity with our laws and our constitution.” For a year, we kept putting that to the U.S. authorities, and the U.S. was stone deaf. They were not prepared to countenance any suggestion that the process was wrong; they were not prepared to countenance anything other than, “Let us have Coke.” That was their position. Now, I thought it was wrong. I thought it was bullying of a country. And I was in a difficult position, because Coke was connected with my constituency and my party.
That must have made things especially challenging.
If Coke was not connected to West Kingston, if Coke was from some other community, and if Coke was not connected as a supporter of the Jamaica Labor Party, I don’t think we would have had this problem. Because Jamaica has in the past refused request for extradition on technical grounds. So we would not have had this problem. We had this problem because of that connection. And my difficult position was how do you credibly say to people, “I am standing on principle, I am standing on our constitution, I am standing on our laws, which my oath requires me to faithfully uphold,” without people being cynical and saying, “Hey, you’re doing this because this person is connected.” And then the big mistake that we made was engaging [the Washington law firm] Manatt [Phelps & Phillips].
Manatt received a fifty-thousand-dollar payment to assist the government of Jamaica in resolving the extradition crisis. Can you say where that money came from?
It came from a contributor to the [Jamaica Labor] Party.
But which contributor?
Now that, I wouldn’t disclose. I don’t want to expose that contributor to being disparaged, because when that contributor was making that contribution, that contributor didn’t even know what it was being contributed for. Just a long-standing contributor to the Party who was approached by the Party’s finance people, and he agreed to make this contribution.
Can you say that the contributor was not Coke or someone connected to him, or not another don or someone connected to them?
The source of these funds has nothing to do with Coke or anyone of his ilk.
How powerful was Coke?
He was powerful in the community [West Kingston], particularly among the young unemployed.
Some people have said that his power was island-wide.
He had influence. He was a benefactor, and he had support among the people who benefitted from him. There was resentment towards Coke by a significant number of the citizens in West Kingston, but it was always muted. They were afraid to even express it; they would talk to you privately, but they would never say anything in the hearing of anybody else.
As the member of Parliament who represented an area where Coke had so much influence, how did you manage your relationship with him?
It was difficult. I myself had not spoken to Coke since December of 2007. I just insulated and isolated my own activities from what they were doing. They developed a community thing, like sports programs, back-to-school treats, Christmas treats, and so on. They did their thing and I did mine. I would do my back-to-school, my sports program, they did theirs.
And he didn’t seek you out and you didn’t seek him out?
No. And that all came about because of one thing that might be of interest to you. In December of 2007, I received information that there were persons the police were seeking… who were hiding in West Kingston…. Now, Coke had sufficient influence that these persons were not likely to be in Tivoli Gardens without his knowledge. And I sent an emissary to him with very clear words that if these persons are being harbored in the community, it would put the entire community at risk, because if the security forces were to enter the community in search of these persons, there is the possibility of confrontation and there is the possibility of innocent people being killed. The message I got back from him was, “No, there is no such person being harbored in West Kingston.” The police conducted an operation sometime afterward, and in that operation, I think, some of the persons were found, some of the persons were seen, some of them escaped. I felt betrayed because I was seeking to protect the residents, and it seemed to me that he was seeking to protect these criminals who came from outside. And because of that … I basically cut him off, I basically said, “I will have nothing to do with him and his operation because if I cannot secure compliance on a simple matter that is intended to protect the citizens of the community, then I would have nothing to do with him.” That was my position. And for the rest of the time, up until the time when he was extradited, I didn’t see him, I had no discussion with him.
Have you heard about these videos that were shot from the [U.S. Department of Homeland Security] plane?
Only through your report.
And do you know, does the Jamaican government have those videos?
I don’t know. Certainly, I wasn’t aware of them during the time I was involved.
You were never given any videos.
No, no. I only became aware of them when you did your article and that became public.
Should the public defender have those videos now?
I don’t know, I can’t say…. I don’t think it would be that difficult for the government to simply send a note verbale to the U.S. government and to request that these videos be made available.
Do you think that’s something they should do?
I think so, yes. Absolutely, absolutely. Because that would help to corroborate or challenge whatever comes out in the public defender’s report.
But my understanding is that they haven’t yet asked for—
I don’t know why they wouldn’t.
Where do you see the relationship between Jamaica and the U.S. heading in the future?
Well, you need to put it in perspective. The relationship between the United States and Jamaica—indeed, the relationship between the United States and most, if not all, other countries in the Caribbean—has waned somewhat ever since the end of the Cold War. Back then, the relationship was based on geopolitics. That relationship was strongly based on geopolitics, and during the period of Communist expansionism throughout Latin America, and particularly because of our close proximity to Cuba, we were seen as a critical ally. In fact, during the seventies and eighties, we were seen as the bulkhead against Communism taking over the Caribbean. Mr. [Edward] Seaga, for example, who was then Prime Minister, was the first official visitor from a foreign country to President Reagan in the White House—that’s how close the relationship was. Once the Cold War ended, that geopolitical significance virtually disappeared, and over that time, the relationship has been more formal, technical. So, for example, high on the agenda that defines that relationship now is drug trafficking, because that is affecting America, that is where the drugs eventually end up, and Jamaica is sort of dead in the middle of the narco route.
And how do you feel about America’s approach to that problem?
I don’t think that there is any slight toward Jamaica. I think that Jamaica, like the rest of the Caribbean, and some would even say like Latin America—or most of Latin America if we include Mexico and Colombia—have just suffered because we are no longer seen as that critical to the U.S. In fairness to the U.S., they have, since that time, since the collapse of the Iron Curtain, they have been engaged in, firstly, the consequential developments in central and eastern Europe where countries that were under Communist rule were now embracing democracy and so on, and the U.S. naturally had to divert a lot of its attention and its resources to help those countries there. And then, after that, there has been 9/11, there is the new international terrorism that has to be fought. So, in fairness to the U.S., there are a number of pressing matters that have just diverted its attention from places like the Caribbean. We are small…
What I’m hearing you saying is there is, through circumstance, something of—“neglect” is almost what I want to say.
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Bill Clinton tried. When he met with the leaders of the Caribbean, gave a number of undertakings. Those never materialized to the extent that we had expected. President Obama, when we met with him in Trinidad, gave some undertakings. That was followed up by the Caribbean Security Initiative that Secretary of State Clinton presented. Again, that is skewed heavily toward drug trafficking. It’s a little surprising, for example, that in terms of our bilateral partners, Venezuela, through the Petrocaribe facility, is perhaps our largest single benefactor.
Is the current approach to the war on drugs the best one?
In order for us to mount an effective fight against it, we would have to divert money from education, from health services, from infrastructure. So it requires much more than is currently available. The U.S. and Europe have to play a more decisive role, they have to provide more resources, because we don’t consume the drugs.
This might be the most important question I have to ask you. I visited Tivoli Gardens, and the situation there is much the same. The people of your former constituency are very desperate. A lot of them can’t pay their light bills. And now they don’t have Coke to look to when they need something. One man told me, ‘The young men are so angry, you can’t even believe, seeing what they saw. This will happen again. It won’t be seventy-some people, it’ll be a thousand people.’ What is your response is to that? Can anything be done to solve these deep structural problems?
Well, it’s part of the dilemma that we face in Jamaica. The answer to that problem is not handouts. It is not make-work projects. The answer to that problem is to empower these people, these young men, by retrofitting their skills, training, mobilizing the kind of investments—part-public, part-private—that would create opportunities for them. But how you do that in the context of an international economic crisis and an internationally laid-down dogma that says that we must get rid of the deficit, we must build huge surpluses, we must cut our borrowing, cut our debt. These two things, they are not compatible. Some sacrifices are going to have to be made, but some desperation is going to have to be avoided as well. Greece is too large not to be taken notice of. We are so small that we don’t have to command any attention. That’s the real difficulty that we face, and, therefore, keeping hopes alive for youngsters like that is going to be the challenge of this and any future government in the context of what is happening worldwide.
Did you ever explore alternative approaches, such as decriminalizing marijuana?
We looked at it. But we couldn’t get very far. And we couldn’t get very far because the United States made it very clear to us that any move we make in that direction would almost certainly lead to decertification. And that decertification carries horrendous consequences.
Decertification?
Each year, the President of the United States issues a list of countries that are decertified, which means that these countries are not doing enough in the fight against drugs, and therefore, you encounter problems in terms of technical programs, aid programs, even raising funds commercially. You don’t want to be on that decertified list.
What are your plans for the future?
I’m retired, I’m spending a lot of time with my grandchildren…. I have some options, but I’ve decided to take some time. I needed some time off, and that’s what I’m doing.
Read more http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...#ixzz22ahvjOxZ
At the center of this mess was Jamaica’s then-Prime Minister, Bruce Golding, who also represented Tivoli Gardens as a member of Parliament. Golding spent months delaying the extradition request. His party hired a Washington law firm to lobby against it. Golding has maintained that he was acting on principle and that the wiretap evidence used by the U.S. to indict Coke was illegal under Jamaican law. But many people have argued that Coke had influence over Golding and that Jamaica was on the verge of becoming a narco-state. Hardley Lewin, the former head of Jamaica’s military, has suggested that when the extradition request finally went through, Golding’s administration leaked the news to Coke, giving him time to muster his forces.
Golding resigned from office in October, 2011. I made several attempts to reach him while reporting the original story, and did not receive a response. I sent Golding an e-mail when I returned to Jamaica earlier this summer, and was surprised when he agreed to an interview. This is his first public comment on the killings since leaving office. We spoke for about an hour in his living room, over glasses of juice from the Bombay mango trees that shade his home in the hills of Kingston. The interview has been edited for length and clarity, and one question and answer come from a follow-up e-mail.
Do you feel that anything went wrong during the operation to arrest Coke?
Difficult to say. A large number of persons were killed. And it is evident to me that some of those persons that were killed were not themselves gunmen, were not confronting the security forces. How many of the seventy-three [killed] fall in that category, as distinct from those who were engaging the police in armed confrontation … because that happened, too. There are reports from residents with whom I spoke that some of the persons who were killed were murdered in cold-blooded fashion. I visited a house, for example, where the mother lost two sons—you might have been to that house, too. She took me into the room and showed me where they were put to kneel down. So there was enough in terms of what I was told and what I saw to suggest that an in-depth investigation was necessary.
The U.S. government has repeatedly said that this was a Jamaican operation conducted by Jamaican security forces. Is that statement accurate?
I requested that the U.S. authorities provide us with aerial surveillance. What I had in mind at that time were satellite images of what was happening on the ground. I didn’t get into the technical details. I simply asked the U.S. ambassador whether her government would be able to provide some aerial intelligence that would assist the security forces in managing the operation.
Were there U.S. personnel on the ground in Tivoli Gardens during the operation?
No. I was never told that they were there. I have no such knowledge.
What kind of reports were you getting, as Prime Minster, from the ground as this whole thing was under way?
I would get regular reports from the security forces. I would get a daily written brief in terms of what was happening on the ground—what success they were achieving, what difficulties they were encountering.
Do you have a sense of what their rules of engagement were, or what their parameters were going in?
No, that was an operational matter over which, by law, I have no authority or jurisdiction.
But this was a pretty serious and historical operation—
It was. It was.
As Prime Minister, did you involve yourself in the details of it at all?
They [the security forces] are subject to the rules and the law and the constitution, and, therefore, if in carrying out the operation something is done which is contrary to law, which is in violation of human rights, then they are held accountable. We don’t know what will come of the public defender’s inquiry. I’m surprised that it has not been submitted. When that is submitted, he may very well refer a copy of that to the director of public prosecutions, to be tabled in parliament, and we’ll have to see from that stage whether there is a basis from which any criminal charges should be laid. What is clear is that the security forces faced a serious challenge to the authority of the state.
During the planning and unfolding of the Tivoli operation, did you hear anything in your updates from the security forces that could shed some light on these many allegations of extrajudicial killings?
None of the reports or briefings I received from the security forces acknowledged any unlawful [or] extrajudicial behavior. They would always give the assurance that all credible allegations or charges would be promptly and thoroughly investigated.
After months of challenging the legality of the U.S. request to extradite Coke, you abruptly reversed your position. There has been much speculation in Jamaica about what caused you to change your mind. Can you shed any light on your thinking at that time?
I met with the head of security forces on the morning of that Sunday [May 23rd]. They indicated to me that their intelligence told them that there was a significant and massive buildup of armory and armed men in the area—not only in Tivoli but the adjoining area—and that they were muscling up to prevent any attempt by the security forces to enter the area. [The security forces] recommended to me that to ensure that they can effectively restore law and order, a state of emergency was required.
Were you experiencing diplomatic pressure from the U.S. during this time?
Well, nothing unusual. I mean, there was a lot of U.S. pressure in relation to the extradition of Coke.
And you for a time were resisting processing the extradition—
Yeah, there was that. But there was no pressure in relation to the security forces going into Tivoli Gardens to conduct the operation, no specific—
But at one point you changed your position and said that the extradition order would be signed and processed.
Well, that was because the country was in a crisis, the government was in a crisis, and I had to make a decision. I had to decide whether—much as I believed that the process that was used was wrong, that it was a violation of our laws and our constitution, that it was setting a dangerous precedent—I felt the broader interests of the country would not be served by stubbornly pursuing that position.
So if someone had the perception that your arm was being twisted by the U.S. government during this time, would that perception be wrong?
That would be wrong. The U.S. made it very clear from the beginning of this Coke issue that the extradition of Coke to the United States was an issue of fundamental importance—not at the time when the operation in Tivoli took place, they made that clear from the very beginning, that they attached great importance to Coke’s extradition.
And as you probably know, we said to them, “The process you have used is wrong.” There is a provision in our constitution that guarantees the right to privacy of communication, such as telephone calls. Parliament passed a law that allows that right to be abridged, provided certain things are satisfied. There must be reasonable suspicion that it is necessary in the interest of public safety, the pursuit of criminals, and so on. But parliament was so cautious in allowing that right to be abridged that parliament said, “Before you can do that you must go to a judge of the Supreme Court, present your case, and get the judge to authorize it.”
So your argument was procedural.
We said to the United States, “These are violations that have taken place. We cannot abide these violations. We will hold the extradition request, we are not going to refuse [it]. We will hold it. We simply ask you to send a new request that is in conformity with our laws and our constitution.” For a year, we kept putting that to the U.S. authorities, and the U.S. was stone deaf. They were not prepared to countenance any suggestion that the process was wrong; they were not prepared to countenance anything other than, “Let us have Coke.” That was their position. Now, I thought it was wrong. I thought it was bullying of a country. And I was in a difficult position, because Coke was connected with my constituency and my party.
That must have made things especially challenging.
If Coke was not connected to West Kingston, if Coke was from some other community, and if Coke was not connected as a supporter of the Jamaica Labor Party, I don’t think we would have had this problem. Because Jamaica has in the past refused request for extradition on technical grounds. So we would not have had this problem. We had this problem because of that connection. And my difficult position was how do you credibly say to people, “I am standing on principle, I am standing on our constitution, I am standing on our laws, which my oath requires me to faithfully uphold,” without people being cynical and saying, “Hey, you’re doing this because this person is connected.” And then the big mistake that we made was engaging [the Washington law firm] Manatt [Phelps & Phillips].
Manatt received a fifty-thousand-dollar payment to assist the government of Jamaica in resolving the extradition crisis. Can you say where that money came from?
It came from a contributor to the [Jamaica Labor] Party.
But which contributor?
Now that, I wouldn’t disclose. I don’t want to expose that contributor to being disparaged, because when that contributor was making that contribution, that contributor didn’t even know what it was being contributed for. Just a long-standing contributor to the Party who was approached by the Party’s finance people, and he agreed to make this contribution.
Can you say that the contributor was not Coke or someone connected to him, or not another don or someone connected to them?
The source of these funds has nothing to do with Coke or anyone of his ilk.
How powerful was Coke?
He was powerful in the community [West Kingston], particularly among the young unemployed.
Some people have said that his power was island-wide.
He had influence. He was a benefactor, and he had support among the people who benefitted from him. There was resentment towards Coke by a significant number of the citizens in West Kingston, but it was always muted. They were afraid to even express it; they would talk to you privately, but they would never say anything in the hearing of anybody else.
As the member of Parliament who represented an area where Coke had so much influence, how did you manage your relationship with him?
It was difficult. I myself had not spoken to Coke since December of 2007. I just insulated and isolated my own activities from what they were doing. They developed a community thing, like sports programs, back-to-school treats, Christmas treats, and so on. They did their thing and I did mine. I would do my back-to-school, my sports program, they did theirs.
And he didn’t seek you out and you didn’t seek him out?
No. And that all came about because of one thing that might be of interest to you. In December of 2007, I received information that there were persons the police were seeking… who were hiding in West Kingston…. Now, Coke had sufficient influence that these persons were not likely to be in Tivoli Gardens without his knowledge. And I sent an emissary to him with very clear words that if these persons are being harbored in the community, it would put the entire community at risk, because if the security forces were to enter the community in search of these persons, there is the possibility of confrontation and there is the possibility of innocent people being killed. The message I got back from him was, “No, there is no such person being harbored in West Kingston.” The police conducted an operation sometime afterward, and in that operation, I think, some of the persons were found, some of the persons were seen, some of them escaped. I felt betrayed because I was seeking to protect the residents, and it seemed to me that he was seeking to protect these criminals who came from outside. And because of that … I basically cut him off, I basically said, “I will have nothing to do with him and his operation because if I cannot secure compliance on a simple matter that is intended to protect the citizens of the community, then I would have nothing to do with him.” That was my position. And for the rest of the time, up until the time when he was extradited, I didn’t see him, I had no discussion with him.
Have you heard about these videos that were shot from the [U.S. Department of Homeland Security] plane?
Only through your report.
And do you know, does the Jamaican government have those videos?
I don’t know. Certainly, I wasn’t aware of them during the time I was involved.
You were never given any videos.
No, no. I only became aware of them when you did your article and that became public.
Should the public defender have those videos now?
I don’t know, I can’t say…. I don’t think it would be that difficult for the government to simply send a note verbale to the U.S. government and to request that these videos be made available.
Do you think that’s something they should do?
I think so, yes. Absolutely, absolutely. Because that would help to corroborate or challenge whatever comes out in the public defender’s report.
But my understanding is that they haven’t yet asked for—
I don’t know why they wouldn’t.
Where do you see the relationship between Jamaica and the U.S. heading in the future?
Well, you need to put it in perspective. The relationship between the United States and Jamaica—indeed, the relationship between the United States and most, if not all, other countries in the Caribbean—has waned somewhat ever since the end of the Cold War. Back then, the relationship was based on geopolitics. That relationship was strongly based on geopolitics, and during the period of Communist expansionism throughout Latin America, and particularly because of our close proximity to Cuba, we were seen as a critical ally. In fact, during the seventies and eighties, we were seen as the bulkhead against Communism taking over the Caribbean. Mr. [Edward] Seaga, for example, who was then Prime Minister, was the first official visitor from a foreign country to President Reagan in the White House—that’s how close the relationship was. Once the Cold War ended, that geopolitical significance virtually disappeared, and over that time, the relationship has been more formal, technical. So, for example, high on the agenda that defines that relationship now is drug trafficking, because that is affecting America, that is where the drugs eventually end up, and Jamaica is sort of dead in the middle of the narco route.
And how do you feel about America’s approach to that problem?
I don’t think that there is any slight toward Jamaica. I think that Jamaica, like the rest of the Caribbean, and some would even say like Latin America—or most of Latin America if we include Mexico and Colombia—have just suffered because we are no longer seen as that critical to the U.S. In fairness to the U.S., they have, since that time, since the collapse of the Iron Curtain, they have been engaged in, firstly, the consequential developments in central and eastern Europe where countries that were under Communist rule were now embracing democracy and so on, and the U.S. naturally had to divert a lot of its attention and its resources to help those countries there. And then, after that, there has been 9/11, there is the new international terrorism that has to be fought. So, in fairness to the U.S., there are a number of pressing matters that have just diverted its attention from places like the Caribbean. We are small…
What I’m hearing you saying is there is, through circumstance, something of—“neglect” is almost what I want to say.
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Bill Clinton tried. When he met with the leaders of the Caribbean, gave a number of undertakings. Those never materialized to the extent that we had expected. President Obama, when we met with him in Trinidad, gave some undertakings. That was followed up by the Caribbean Security Initiative that Secretary of State Clinton presented. Again, that is skewed heavily toward drug trafficking. It’s a little surprising, for example, that in terms of our bilateral partners, Venezuela, through the Petrocaribe facility, is perhaps our largest single benefactor.
Is the current approach to the war on drugs the best one?
In order for us to mount an effective fight against it, we would have to divert money from education, from health services, from infrastructure. So it requires much more than is currently available. The U.S. and Europe have to play a more decisive role, they have to provide more resources, because we don’t consume the drugs.
This might be the most important question I have to ask you. I visited Tivoli Gardens, and the situation there is much the same. The people of your former constituency are very desperate. A lot of them can’t pay their light bills. And now they don’t have Coke to look to when they need something. One man told me, ‘The young men are so angry, you can’t even believe, seeing what they saw. This will happen again. It won’t be seventy-some people, it’ll be a thousand people.’ What is your response is to that? Can anything be done to solve these deep structural problems?
Well, it’s part of the dilemma that we face in Jamaica. The answer to that problem is not handouts. It is not make-work projects. The answer to that problem is to empower these people, these young men, by retrofitting their skills, training, mobilizing the kind of investments—part-public, part-private—that would create opportunities for them. But how you do that in the context of an international economic crisis and an internationally laid-down dogma that says that we must get rid of the deficit, we must build huge surpluses, we must cut our borrowing, cut our debt. These two things, they are not compatible. Some sacrifices are going to have to be made, but some desperation is going to have to be avoided as well. Greece is too large not to be taken notice of. We are so small that we don’t have to command any attention. That’s the real difficulty that we face, and, therefore, keeping hopes alive for youngsters like that is going to be the challenge of this and any future government in the context of what is happening worldwide.
Did you ever explore alternative approaches, such as decriminalizing marijuana?
We looked at it. But we couldn’t get very far. And we couldn’t get very far because the United States made it very clear to us that any move we make in that direction would almost certainly lead to decertification. And that decertification carries horrendous consequences.
Decertification?
Each year, the President of the United States issues a list of countries that are decertified, which means that these countries are not doing enough in the fight against drugs, and therefore, you encounter problems in terms of technical programs, aid programs, even raising funds commercially. You don’t want to be on that decertified list.
What are your plans for the future?
I’m retired, I’m spending a lot of time with my grandchildren…. I have some options, but I’ve decided to take some time. I needed some time off, and that’s what I’m doing.
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