Tweet
Alarming revelations
In judicial matters, the element of fear is usually associated with efforts to get witnesses to stay away from giving evidence, as in the recent case of the missing sand in Falmouth.
However, the Sunday Herald has unearthed a new and possibly more dangerous dimension whereby judges seem to be fearful, as it relates to the authorisation of warrants for the interception of telephone calls to gather intelligence in narco trafficking.
Judicial sources have told the Sunday Herald that during the life of the secret operation, ANTHEM, disclosed in the MOU between the governments of Jamaica and, Britain and the United States, high court judges had been reluctant to sign warrants to intercept telephone calls of suspected drug dealers because of fear and that in most cases, the requests had to be taken to the then Chief Justice Lensley Wolfe, for his signature.
Operation ATHEM was one the programmes in the two MOUs used by Jamaica and its international partners to track narco dealers and using cutting edge electronic devices to eavesdrop on telephone calls The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (USDEA) paid US$3.2 or J$27 million for access to Cable& Wireless mobile and landline networks and to Digicel mobile network. And it was also agreed that the "DEA may be asked to contribute, on an equal basis, to any costs involved in the expansion or upgrading of the ANTHEM facility, including but not limited to, any costs involved in extending its capability to the interception of communications carried by other telecommunication service providers."
The existence of the secret MOUs surfaced during week two of the Manatt Commission of Enquiry in progress at the Jamaica Conference Centre in downtown Kingston.
Network design
In both memoranda, the Jamaican Military Intelligence Unit (MIU), two branches of local police, Special Branch (SB) and the Jamaican Narcotics Division (JND), the United Kingdom's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Her Majesty's Customs and Excise (HMCE), National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) were the main players in a network designed to gather information on narco trafficking and the growth of organized crime.
MOU one covered the ground rules governing the sharing of intelligence with the DEA gathered by the UK funded intercept facility. While MOU two sets out the arrangement agreed on for the supply of intelligence from the interceptions from C&W and Digicel networks. Under the latter it was pointed out that the DEA might use such information as evidence in US courts.
Under MOU one, the operation codenamed ANTHEM was established under which UK authorities through its Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and HMCE funded and installed a telecommunications intercept facility in Jamaica in 2004.
This was under the control of local Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) Special Branch and the Jamaican Narcotics Division (JND).
The agreement stipulates that ANTHEM would be managed by nominated representatives of the Jamaican authorities in consultation with nominated representatives from the UK authorities.
Together they form the Joint ANTHEM Consultative Group (JACG). That group was responsible for ensuring that intelligence obtained by the Jamaican authorities from their use of the intercept facility and shared with the UK authorities would be put to the most effective use.
Representatives from the UK along with Jamaican, and the DEA country attaché in Jamaica together formed the ANTHEM Targeting Action Committee (ATAC). This group was mandated to ensure that Jamaica got the "best possible intelligence with which to make targeting decisions for ANTHEM.
To this end, ATAC had the liberty to include in its deliberations, representatives of other liaison services interested in combating the trafficking of narcotics and the associated growth in organized crime, whether financial or violent.
Intelligence purposes only Information channeled to the DEA was researched and analysed, the results sent back to the local based JACG for its use.
Likewise, JACG would provide analysis and intelligence requested by the DEA. In cases where ANTEHM intelligence was shared with DEA, it was passed to the DEA's Special Operations Division (SOD), which was responsible for putting it into a format, which conceals its sources and in particular the existence of ANTHEM before it was disseminated within the DEA.
Knowledge of ANTHEM within DEA was restricted to the country attaché in Kingston. ATAC was responsible for coordinating the use of the intelligence derived from ANTHEM along with relevant intelligence information derived from parties falling under the MOU.
It was agreed that all intelligence passed to the DEA was done with the "understanding and condition that it will be used for intelligence purposes only." As such the source of the intelligence or information from which the source of the intelligence might be identified "will not be disclosed (including court proceedings) and the intelligence itself will not be disseminated outside the DEA's SOD component entities without the agreement of JACG." It was also agreed that when dissemination takes place it should have the following caveat:
"This information is provided only for intelligence purposes in an effort to develop potential investigative leads to be used in affidavits, court proceedings, subpoenas or for legal purposes."
It was noted, "Any interception of communications by the Jamaican authorities will be carried out strictly in accordance with the requirements of Jamaican Law. Similarly, such intercept product will be held and if appropriate passed on by them strictly in accordance with the requirements of Jamaican Law."
The UK and DEA authorities made it clear that they reserved the right to withdraw all support from ANTHEM should it come to their attention that the intercept facility supplied to the Jamaican authorities had been used for purposes other than combating the trafficking of narcotics and the associated growth in organized crime.
Shifting responsibilities Changes were made to the method used in the gathering and dissemination of information in MOU two. Under MOU two, engineers from the British SIS installed and maintained a link to the local narcotics headquarters to enable narcotics agents to intercept communications on C&W and Digicel switches. SIS engineers were not responsible for the management of any interception of the communications or for the installation and maintenance of any recording equipment. Costs for all hardware, software and engineering were paid for by the DEA.
Local narcotics agents were now responsible for supplying DEA the product from the JND link in a format that the DEA could use as evidence in US courts.
Knowledge of the link between the ANTHEM facility and JND and the product of such interceptions of communications as may be carried out using the JND link will be restricted to representatives of the DEA, JND and ANTHEM teams approved by the JACG.
As with intelligence intercepts, all requests by DEA for interceptions of communications using the JND link will be considered by ATAC, who will report to the Jamaican authorities with a recommendation.
To help ensure the secrecy of the JND link, JND offers using the link and their DEA counterparts (the JND link team) will have no contact with the telecommunications service providers whose networks ANTHEM has access to. All contact will be by JACG representatives, after consultation with the JND link team.
The MOU further states, "Any interception of communications by the JND through the JND link will be carried out strictly in accordance with the requirements of Jamaican law. Similarly, such product as they obtain through their use of the JND link will be held and, if appropriate, passed on by them to the DEA strictly in accordance with the requirements of Jamaican law
http://m.jamaicaobserver.com/news/12...tradited-to-US
https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news...red-extradited
Comment