GUERRILLA WARFARE - No retreat, No surrender
published: Sunday | November 6, 2005
Arnold Bertram
THERE ARE some 17 urban communities where the criminals are sufficiently organised and armed to challenge the state, and attempt to establish their own social order. However, not all members of these communities subscribe to the imposition of criminal overlords. There is still a broad stratum "of the striving working poor who see themselves as law-abiding and respectable with aspiration of upward mobility and ambition for self and community recovery." Unfortunately, intimidation and fear of reprisals make them far too silent.
The three communities in which the criminal agenda is most advanced, and which consequently pose the greatest threat to the state are Tivoli Gardens, Arnett Gardens and selected enclaves of Spanish Town which come under the influence of the 'One Order' and 'Clansman' gangs. All three areas were oriented to crime and a depreciation of the value of life by the process which established them as political garrisons. They have never recovered morally from the deliberate and methodical conscription of the urban poor into partisan political militias.
THE ROAD TO PERDITION
The concept of the garrison was first pioneered by D.C. Tavares in South West St. Andrew, who, after the JLP victory of 1962, became the first minister of housing in independent Jamaica. His most successful protégée was Edward Seaga, on whose watch some 2,300 huts which housed the most militant PNP supporters were bulldozed between 1963 and 1966, and the occupants forced "to move and keep moving".
Despite the protest from the church and civil society, too many law-abiding Jamaicans kept silent or rationalised the perpetration of this evil. They would discover later that it was this exodus from western Kingston which subsequently created proliferation of squatter settlement from White Mall in St. Catherine to August Town in St. Andrew. Worst, it nurtured in the hearts of the displaced a deep desire for revenge.
Tavares' plans to extend the garrisons to South St. Andrew were hardly interrupted by his death in 1968, for his successor Wilton Hill was just as committed to the enterprise. It was the PNP victory in 1972 which brought a halt to the JLP expansionist design and provided the opportunity for both revenge and the beginning of PNP hegemony in the area. Leading the PNP challenge was the new Minister of Housing, Tony Spaulding, under whose watch Arnett Gardens was created in the image of Tivoli Gardens.
I recall only too well the forced eviction of the Labourites from a section of Rema in 1977, and like many of my colleagues rationalised it on the basis of dealing with the threat posed by Seaga. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that I came to realise the extent to which the further division of the poor into permanent warring tribes, and the cruelty with which it was achieved eroded the moral authority of democratic socialism.
Some of the displaced Labourites found their way to Spanish Town and were ready and available to Bruce Golding when he arrived in 1983 to establish his garrison. Like his predecessors, Spaulding and Tavares, Golding found the housing ministry the perfect base for an ambitious politician committed to garrison politics. Once again, the forced evacuations were replicated, and comrades as well as persons of no political affiliation found themselves overnight without shelter.
Throughout the entire process, once again, too many law-abiding persons watched in silence, or worse, gave tacit support or made financial contributions.
By the elections of 1989, those most discriminated against were ready to oppose Golding's garrison in Central St. Catherine with all available means at their disposal. Among those joining the opposition to Golding was a teenager named Donovan 'Bulbie' Bennett, who later became the leader of the notorious 'Clansman' gang.
Golding left the JLP in 1995 and in a new and different political posture formed the National Democratic Movement (NDM) and proclaimed a parting of the ways with garrison politics. However, it seems that he had built it too well, as evident in the emergence of the 'One Order' gang.
A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS
Last week a new generation of criminal terrorists took to the streets to protest the death of Bennett who was killed in a shoot-out with the police. They carried out such acts of mayhem and vandalism that will be difficult to equal, much more surpass. While the lawless revelled in the public disorder, for the law-abiding there could hardly have been a more welcome sight than that which appeared on television of criminal terrorists burning the campaign paraphernalia of presidential candidate, Peter Phillips. This public admission that an unbridgeable gulf separates him from them should be enough to inspire confidence that the man, who more than likely will be Jamaica's next prime minister, is totally committed to the fight against crime and for the restoration of public order.
FIGHTING FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE COMMUNITY
The political garrisons in Spanish Town and Western Kingston share the common feature of access to a flourishing market district in the centre of the community, as well as to high-rise housing accommodations which give them not only a clear view of operation on the ground, but a strategic military advantage in confrontation with the security forces.
The most important lesson learnt from the mayhem in Spanish Town was the extent to which the criminals had converted selected communities into supportive military bases. This is classic guerrilla warfare strategy. "These support bases are points the enemy cannot penetrate except at the cost of heavy losses. They are a refuge and a resource for the purpose of more and more distant and daring raids". As our security forces are discovering, these bases provide tight security for training of recruits, storage of weapons and ammunition, and makeshift facilities for treating the wounded.
In these communities women and children provide the first line of defence against any attempt by the security forces to apprehend criminals. These tactics are deployed after the cynical calculation that the state will not fire upon women and children, and even instances where the criminals themselves commit atrocities, there is an influential lobby to protest what they persistently claim to be an infraction of criminal rights. I watched with amazement as one TV station allowed recipients of criminal largesse to proclaim the benevolence of their criminal benefactors without asking a single question as to where the money came from.
A new an interesting dimension has been added to the strategies employed by criminals to avoid apprehension. This is the acquisition of 'safe' houses all over the countryside, where accomplices live posing as returning residents.
NIGHTMARE FOR SECURITY FORCES
We have now reached the stage where the criminal networks will drop their political labels and pooling their resources in the fight against law and order. Indeed, last week in Spanish Town there was open facilitation and consultation between 'Clansman' and 'One-Order' gangs. Despite their pretensions, their only interest in party politics is the possibility of facilitation and patronage by politicians. I have no doubt, not one of them could recognise a portrait of either Norman Manley or Alexander Bustamante, much more to state what they stood for.
In the light of this reality, the number one priority must be the immediate expansion of the police force, and its coordination with the JDF so as to be able to deal with the hot spots of crime simultaneously.
Despite the resources and ruthlessness of the criminal elite, I have never seen Jamaica's security forces more confident in their capacity to deal with criminals, or more unfettered to ignore partisan politics in the execution of duties. The improving relationship with the community is yielding critical intelligence and the capacity building process has begun to pay rich dividends. It only remains for national security to be accorded first claim on the country's resources which any national priority should have.
SUCCESS MEANS FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS
Minister Phillips has repeatedly stated that more effective policing is only one part of the equation in the management of crime and the building of social cohesion. Just as urgent is the provision of jobs and vital community infrastructure to give the urban poor and unemployed a real alternative to a life of crime, and a cleaner environment for themselves and families to live.
The challenge of providing simultaneously economic, social, and military components of crime fighting require a real alliance between the government, the private sector, civil society and the community. The single factor which makes success possible in the fight against crime is the new determination from our law enforcement agencies, that in the face of a relentless threat from the criminals in our midst, the response of the law-abiding must be 'no retreat, no surrender'.
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/glean...ead/lead8.html
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Plenty of sins! ...many to share the blame!
published: Sunday | November 6, 2005
Arnold Bertram
THERE ARE some 17 urban communities where the criminals are sufficiently organised and armed to challenge the state, and attempt to establish their own social order. However, not all members of these communities subscribe to the imposition of criminal overlords. There is still a broad stratum "of the striving working poor who see themselves as law-abiding and respectable with aspiration of upward mobility and ambition for self and community recovery." Unfortunately, intimidation and fear of reprisals make them far too silent.
The three communities in which the criminal agenda is most advanced, and which consequently pose the greatest threat to the state are Tivoli Gardens, Arnett Gardens and selected enclaves of Spanish Town which come under the influence of the 'One Order' and 'Clansman' gangs. All three areas were oriented to crime and a depreciation of the value of life by the process which established them as political garrisons. They have never recovered morally from the deliberate and methodical conscription of the urban poor into partisan political militias.
THE ROAD TO PERDITION
The concept of the garrison was first pioneered by D.C. Tavares in South West St. Andrew, who, after the JLP victory of 1962, became the first minister of housing in independent Jamaica. His most successful protégée was Edward Seaga, on whose watch some 2,300 huts which housed the most militant PNP supporters were bulldozed between 1963 and 1966, and the occupants forced "to move and keep moving".
Despite the protest from the church and civil society, too many law-abiding Jamaicans kept silent or rationalised the perpetration of this evil. They would discover later that it was this exodus from western Kingston which subsequently created proliferation of squatter settlement from White Mall in St. Catherine to August Town in St. Andrew. Worst, it nurtured in the hearts of the displaced a deep desire for revenge.
Tavares' plans to extend the garrisons to South St. Andrew were hardly interrupted by his death in 1968, for his successor Wilton Hill was just as committed to the enterprise. It was the PNP victory in 1972 which brought a halt to the JLP expansionist design and provided the opportunity for both revenge and the beginning of PNP hegemony in the area. Leading the PNP challenge was the new Minister of Housing, Tony Spaulding, under whose watch Arnett Gardens was created in the image of Tivoli Gardens.
I recall only too well the forced eviction of the Labourites from a section of Rema in 1977, and like many of my colleagues rationalised it on the basis of dealing with the threat posed by Seaga. It is only with the benefit of hindsight that I came to realise the extent to which the further division of the poor into permanent warring tribes, and the cruelty with which it was achieved eroded the moral authority of democratic socialism.
Some of the displaced Labourites found their way to Spanish Town and were ready and available to Bruce Golding when he arrived in 1983 to establish his garrison. Like his predecessors, Spaulding and Tavares, Golding found the housing ministry the perfect base for an ambitious politician committed to garrison politics. Once again, the forced evacuations were replicated, and comrades as well as persons of no political affiliation found themselves overnight without shelter.
Throughout the entire process, once again, too many law-abiding persons watched in silence, or worse, gave tacit support or made financial contributions.
By the elections of 1989, those most discriminated against were ready to oppose Golding's garrison in Central St. Catherine with all available means at their disposal. Among those joining the opposition to Golding was a teenager named Donovan 'Bulbie' Bennett, who later became the leader of the notorious 'Clansman' gang.
Golding left the JLP in 1995 and in a new and different political posture formed the National Democratic Movement (NDM) and proclaimed a parting of the ways with garrison politics. However, it seems that he had built it too well, as evident in the emergence of the 'One Order' gang.
A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS
Last week a new generation of criminal terrorists took to the streets to protest the death of Bennett who was killed in a shoot-out with the police. They carried out such acts of mayhem and vandalism that will be difficult to equal, much more surpass. While the lawless revelled in the public disorder, for the law-abiding there could hardly have been a more welcome sight than that which appeared on television of criminal terrorists burning the campaign paraphernalia of presidential candidate, Peter Phillips. This public admission that an unbridgeable gulf separates him from them should be enough to inspire confidence that the man, who more than likely will be Jamaica's next prime minister, is totally committed to the fight against crime and for the restoration of public order.
FIGHTING FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE COMMUNITY
The political garrisons in Spanish Town and Western Kingston share the common feature of access to a flourishing market district in the centre of the community, as well as to high-rise housing accommodations which give them not only a clear view of operation on the ground, but a strategic military advantage in confrontation with the security forces.
The most important lesson learnt from the mayhem in Spanish Town was the extent to which the criminals had converted selected communities into supportive military bases. This is classic guerrilla warfare strategy. "These support bases are points the enemy cannot penetrate except at the cost of heavy losses. They are a refuge and a resource for the purpose of more and more distant and daring raids". As our security forces are discovering, these bases provide tight security for training of recruits, storage of weapons and ammunition, and makeshift facilities for treating the wounded.
In these communities women and children provide the first line of defence against any attempt by the security forces to apprehend criminals. These tactics are deployed after the cynical calculation that the state will not fire upon women and children, and even instances where the criminals themselves commit atrocities, there is an influential lobby to protest what they persistently claim to be an infraction of criminal rights. I watched with amazement as one TV station allowed recipients of criminal largesse to proclaim the benevolence of their criminal benefactors without asking a single question as to where the money came from.
A new an interesting dimension has been added to the strategies employed by criminals to avoid apprehension. This is the acquisition of 'safe' houses all over the countryside, where accomplices live posing as returning residents.
NIGHTMARE FOR SECURITY FORCES
We have now reached the stage where the criminal networks will drop their political labels and pooling their resources in the fight against law and order. Indeed, last week in Spanish Town there was open facilitation and consultation between 'Clansman' and 'One-Order' gangs. Despite their pretensions, their only interest in party politics is the possibility of facilitation and patronage by politicians. I have no doubt, not one of them could recognise a portrait of either Norman Manley or Alexander Bustamante, much more to state what they stood for.
In the light of this reality, the number one priority must be the immediate expansion of the police force, and its coordination with the JDF so as to be able to deal with the hot spots of crime simultaneously.
Despite the resources and ruthlessness of the criminal elite, I have never seen Jamaica's security forces more confident in their capacity to deal with criminals, or more unfettered to ignore partisan politics in the execution of duties. The improving relationship with the community is yielding critical intelligence and the capacity building process has begun to pay rich dividends. It only remains for national security to be accorded first claim on the country's resources which any national priority should have.
SUCCESS MEANS FIGHTING ON ALL FRONTS
Minister Phillips has repeatedly stated that more effective policing is only one part of the equation in the management of crime and the building of social cohesion. Just as urgent is the provision of jobs and vital community infrastructure to give the urban poor and unemployed a real alternative to a life of crime, and a cleaner environment for themselves and families to live.
The challenge of providing simultaneously economic, social, and military components of crime fighting require a real alliance between the government, the private sector, civil society and the community. The single factor which makes success possible in the fight against crime is the new determination from our law enforcement agencies, that in the face of a relentless threat from the criminals in our midst, the response of the law-abiding must be 'no retreat, no surrender'.
http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/glean...ead/lead8.html
-----------
Plenty of sins! ...many to share the blame!
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