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Who is counting the cost?
Henley Morgan
Thursday, December 13, 2007
THE late Mr Anthony Spaulding, the minister of housing in the Michael Manley government of the 1970s, was one of the architects of the political garrison. I never knew the man, but my heart does not warm towards him. Others can better speak to his actions during the time he served as member of parliament for the South St Andrew constituency. Not wanting to speak ill of the dead, I will continue to silently protest the results of those actions by keeping my vow never to again set foot in the football stadium in Arnett Gardens named in his honour.
Dr Omar Davies, the current member of parliament, has often said he practises a different kind of politics and that he has suffered for it. He has also gone on record as saying, if it is the last thing he does before leaving representational politics, he is going to see to the demolition of an apartment building that was built across a section of West Road in the Trench Town community during the tenure of Mr Spaulding. The building, which I disdainfully refer to as Jamaica's Berlin Wall, was meant to prevent the free flow of human and vehicular traffic from JLP-dominated sections of the community to the PNP fortress. It stands as a reminder of the worst era in Jamaica's politics.
Dr Davies knows in more painful ways than most the cost to Jamaica of garrison politics and the culture of crime it ushered in. The World Bank, in a recent study, stated that such is the effect of crime on Jamaica's economy that reducing it to the level of Costa Rica would boost annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 5.4 per cent. What this would have meant for Dr Davies is that instead of an annual average growth rate in GDP of about 1.6 per cent over the last 10 years, his record would be reading closer to seven per cent. Think of what Jamaica would be like today and where Dr Davies might be sitting now.
The architects of garrison politics, innocently or knowingly, robbed Jamaica of much of the wealth that is stored up in its people and institutions. But pointing an accusing finger will not get us as far as pointing a way to the future. To that end and with a new commissioner of police, I am repeating and refining my previously published proposal for subduing and ultimately defeating the crime monster.
There are three main crime-fighting options from which to choose.
. Option No 1: Deterrent Strategy
This strategy centres on getting tougher with criminals. It is based on the premise that the frequency with which serious crimes are committed is due to the perception held by criminals that they can get away with them. By getting tougher with criminals everywhere, it sends a clear message that violent acts will not be tolerated.
. Option No 2: Selective Incapacitation Strategy
This strategy is based on the belief that a large number of crimes are caused by a relatively small number of offenders from a select number of communities, and so the best way to deal with crime is to focus the limited resources on neutralising the "vital few" perpetrators in their nesting places, so to speak.
. Option No 3: Attacking Crime at its Roots
The underlying thinking to this strategy is that widespread poverty, poor education, dysfunctional families and other social maladies are the real causes of crime. Killing criminals or locking them away only make room for succeeding generations more cold-hearted than the ones they replace. To deal resolutely with crime we must attack it at the roots.
Were I the head of government, I would adopt a dual strategy combining Options 2 and 3. Option 2, in the short term, could include targeting criminals and the communities where they live; cordoning off and searching these areas; implementing punitive measures such as 'three strikes and you are out' designed to take offenders out of action for a long time; forfeiture of assets; plea bargaining; meting out to juveniles (boys carrying guns) the same treatment as if they were adults (gunmen); and reinstating the death penalty. Option 3, which is more long-term, could include a Marshall Plan type programme geared towards creating expanded job and educational opportunities for inner-city youths; training in parenting and dispute resolution; setting up prisons that work towards reducing anti-social behaviour and rehabilitating convicts for a future life in society. Together the two options form what I have come to term the "degarrisonisation" process.
The price tag on a comprehensive policing and social reform programme will be hefty. An estimate of the cost is J$50 billion per year over the next five years, or roughly the percentage in GDP growth the World Bank says is lost annually to the country because of crime.
The knee-jerk response to these recommendations is sure to be that the country can't afford it. But is anybody counting the cost of allowing the current situation to continue?
Henley Morgan
Thursday, December 13, 2007
THE late Mr Anthony Spaulding, the minister of housing in the Michael Manley government of the 1970s, was one of the architects of the political garrison. I never knew the man, but my heart does not warm towards him. Others can better speak to his actions during the time he served as member of parliament for the South St Andrew constituency. Not wanting to speak ill of the dead, I will continue to silently protest the results of those actions by keeping my vow never to again set foot in the football stadium in Arnett Gardens named in his honour.
Dr Omar Davies, the current member of parliament, has often said he practises a different kind of politics and that he has suffered for it. He has also gone on record as saying, if it is the last thing he does before leaving representational politics, he is going to see to the demolition of an apartment building that was built across a section of West Road in the Trench Town community during the tenure of Mr Spaulding. The building, which I disdainfully refer to as Jamaica's Berlin Wall, was meant to prevent the free flow of human and vehicular traffic from JLP-dominated sections of the community to the PNP fortress. It stands as a reminder of the worst era in Jamaica's politics.
Dr Davies knows in more painful ways than most the cost to Jamaica of garrison politics and the culture of crime it ushered in. The World Bank, in a recent study, stated that such is the effect of crime on Jamaica's economy that reducing it to the level of Costa Rica would boost annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 5.4 per cent. What this would have meant for Dr Davies is that instead of an annual average growth rate in GDP of about 1.6 per cent over the last 10 years, his record would be reading closer to seven per cent. Think of what Jamaica would be like today and where Dr Davies might be sitting now.
The architects of garrison politics, innocently or knowingly, robbed Jamaica of much of the wealth that is stored up in its people and institutions. But pointing an accusing finger will not get us as far as pointing a way to the future. To that end and with a new commissioner of police, I am repeating and refining my previously published proposal for subduing and ultimately defeating the crime monster.
There are three main crime-fighting options from which to choose.
. Option No 1: Deterrent Strategy
This strategy centres on getting tougher with criminals. It is based on the premise that the frequency with which serious crimes are committed is due to the perception held by criminals that they can get away with them. By getting tougher with criminals everywhere, it sends a clear message that violent acts will not be tolerated.
. Option No 2: Selective Incapacitation Strategy
This strategy is based on the belief that a large number of crimes are caused by a relatively small number of offenders from a select number of communities, and so the best way to deal with crime is to focus the limited resources on neutralising the "vital few" perpetrators in their nesting places, so to speak.
. Option No 3: Attacking Crime at its Roots
The underlying thinking to this strategy is that widespread poverty, poor education, dysfunctional families and other social maladies are the real causes of crime. Killing criminals or locking them away only make room for succeeding generations more cold-hearted than the ones they replace. To deal resolutely with crime we must attack it at the roots.
Were I the head of government, I would adopt a dual strategy combining Options 2 and 3. Option 2, in the short term, could include targeting criminals and the communities where they live; cordoning off and searching these areas; implementing punitive measures such as 'three strikes and you are out' designed to take offenders out of action for a long time; forfeiture of assets; plea bargaining; meting out to juveniles (boys carrying guns) the same treatment as if they were adults (gunmen); and reinstating the death penalty. Option 3, which is more long-term, could include a Marshall Plan type programme geared towards creating expanded job and educational opportunities for inner-city youths; training in parenting and dispute resolution; setting up prisons that work towards reducing anti-social behaviour and rehabilitating convicts for a future life in society. Together the two options form what I have come to term the "degarrisonisation" process.
The price tag on a comprehensive policing and social reform programme will be hefty. An estimate of the cost is J$50 billion per year over the next five years, or roughly the percentage in GDP growth the World Bank says is lost annually to the country because of crime.
The knee-jerk response to these recommendations is sure to be that the country can't afford it. But is anybody counting the cost of allowing the current situation to continue?
You mean my fellow forumites misled me.
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